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What the best and wisest parent wants for his own child, that must the 
community want for all of its children. Any other ideal for our schools 
is narrow and unlovely; acted upon, it destroys our democracy.1 
— John Dewey 
  INTRODUCTION   
The United States stands at a crossroads regarding educa-
tional equity. On one road, the Every Student Succeeds Act 
(ESSA),2 the current reauthorization of the Elementary and Sec-
ondary Education Act (ESEA), greatly reduced federal involve-
ment in education and returned control to state and local gov-
ernments that had repeatedly criticized the prescriptive nature 
of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001.3 In the wake of this 
federal retreat, state and local control of education without ef-
fective federal oversight creates grave concerns for those who ad-
vocate for economically disadvantaged and minority students, 
 
1. THE SAGUARO SEMINAR: CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN AM., HARVARD KEN-
NEDY SCH. OF GOV’T, CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP 36 (2015) [hereinafter 
CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP] (quoting John Dewey, The School and Social 
Progress, in THE SCHOOL AND SOCIETY (Univ. of Chi. Press ed., 1907)). 
 2. Every Student Succeeds Act, Pub. L. No. 114-95, 129 Stat. 1802 (2015). 
 3. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-100, 115 Stat. 1425 
(2002). For a critique of ESSA that contends that the federal government has 
essentially abandoned its role in education, see Derek W. Black, Abandoning 
the Federal Role in Education: The Every Student Succeeds Act, 105 CAL. L. REV. 
1309, 1340–61 (2017). 
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including many civil rights groups.4 History confirms that states 
and localities have repeatedly neglected the needs of these stu-
dents and provided them inferior educational opportunities.5 
On the other road stands a national commitment to equity. 
Federal education law and policy has long included equity as one 
of its chief aims.6 The principle of equal opportunity is a shared 
ideal that has transcended ideological and partisan divisions 
throughout U.S. history.7 New evidence of a national commit-
ment to equity can be found in a statement issued after state 
education chiefs gathered in 2017 under the leadership of the 
Council of Chief State School Officers and the Aspen Institute in 
which state chiefs committed to a set of recommendations re-
garding equity.8 Some skeptics might dismiss this statement as 
mere political posturing.9 However, it is worth remembering that 
the states and a handful of professional associations initiated the 
standards and accountability reform movement that all states 
eventually embraced.10 After a 1989 summit of the nation’s gov-
ernors in Charlottesville, Virginia, the governors released a 
statement that supported national performance goals that would 
 
 4. Julie Hirschfeld Davis, President Obama Signs into Law a Rewrite of 
No Child Left Behind, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2015/12/11/us/politics/president-obama-signs-into-law-a-rewrite-of-no-child 
-left-behind.html.  
 5. Chad Aldeman, The Case Against ESSA: A Very Limited Law, in THE 
EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT: WHAT IT MEANS FOR SCHOOLS, SYSTEMS AND 
STATES 91, 92 (Frederick M. Hess & Max Eden eds., 2017) [hereinafter THE 
EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT]. 
 6. Charles Barone & Elizabeth DeBray, Education Policy in Congress: Per-
spectives from Inside and Out, in CARROTS, STICKS, AND THE BULLY PULPIT: 
LESSONS FROM A HALF-CENTURY OF FEDERAL EFFORTS TO IMPROVE AMERICA’S 
SCHOOLS 61, 63 (Frederick M. Hess & Andrew P. Kelly eds., 2011). 
 7. See CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP, supra note 1, at 8. 
 8. See THE ASPEN INST. EDUC. & SOC’Y PROGRAM & THE COUNCIL OF 
CHIEF STATE SCH. OFFICERS, LEADING FOR EQUITY: OPPORTUNITIES FOR STATE 
EDUCATION CHIEFS (2017), https://ccsso.org/sites/default/files/2018-01/Leading 
%20for%20Equity_011618.pdf (highlighting commitments state chiefs can im-
plement to create equity plans); Daarel Burnette II, State Chiefs at Conference 
Tout Equity Policies in ESSA Plans, EDUC. WK.: POL. K–12, (Feb. 16, 2018, 5:52 
PM), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/state_edwatch/2018/02/state_chiefs_tout_ 
equity_policies_in_essa_plans.html. Work on the recommendations preceded 
the 2016 election and represents the work of not only state chiefs but also dis-
trict leaders and civil rights advocates. Alyson Klein, See How States Plan to 
Approach Equity, EDUC. WK.: POL. K–12, (Feb. 2, 2017, 7:02 AM), https://blogs 
.edweek.org/edweek/campaign-k-12/2017/02/states_plan_approach_equity_ 
ESSA.html. 
 9. See Burnette II, supra note 8 (reporting civil rights and advocacy groups 
skepticism of state implementation of ESSA plans). 
 10. See infra note 11. 
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increase U.S. competitiveness.11 Federal legislation in the form 
of the Improving America’s School Act and No Child Left Behind 
built on what began merely as a widespread expression of state 
support.12 Furthermore, history teaches us that state and local 
experiments that spread horizontally often become embedded in 
federal policy.13 
Indeed, despite its reduction in the federal role in education, 
the bipartisan ESSA retains equity as one of its goals. ESSA’s 
purpose emphasizes this equity aim in noting that the law seeks 
“to provide all children significant opportunity to receive a fair, 
equitable, and high-quality education, and to close educational 
achievement gaps.”14 ESSA also requires states and districts to 
measure and close achievement gaps.15 Districts must intervene 
in the lowest performing schools as well as when subgroups of 
students are underperforming.16 In fact, congressional Demo-
crats insisted that equity requirements be included in ESSA to 
garner their support for the bill.17 
Equity concerns also undergird the numerous recent teacher 
strikes that have occurred throughout the country. Teachers un-
doubtedly want increases in their salaries in light of falling 
teacher pay during the recent recession.18 Yet, many of the 
strikes also seek to address the lackluster funding of schools in 
many states, particularly the reduction in funding since the 2008 
recession.19 Although nationally, combined state and local fund-
ing in actual dollars returned to pre-recession levels by 2016, 
 
 11. DAVID K. COHEN & SUSAN L. MOFFITT, THE ORDEAL OF EQUALITY: DID 
FEDERAL REGULATION FIX THE SCHOOLS? 124 (2009); PATRICK J. MCGUINN, NO 
CHILD LEFT BEHIND AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF FEDERAL EDUCATION POL-
ICY, 1965–2005, at 60–63 (2006).  
 12. COHEN & MOFFITT, supra note 11, at 9–11. 
 13. See CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP, supra note 1, at 10. 
 14. 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2016). 
 15. Id. § 6311(b)(2)(B), 6311(c)(4)(A). 
 16. Id. § 6311(c)(4)(D), 6311(d)(2)(A)–(B). 
 17. Alyson Klein, How ESSA Passed: The Inside Scoop, in THE EVERY STU-
DENT SUCCEEDS ACT, supra note 5, at 43, 54–57. 
 18. See Robert Gebeloff, The Numbers That Explain Why Teachers Are in 
Revolt, N.Y. TIMES: UPSHOT (June 6, 2018), https://nytimes.com/2018/06/04/ 
upshot/school-funding-still-lags-after-recession-ended.html (discussing how ed-
ucation spending cuts have decreased teacher salaries). 
 19. See Moria Ballingit, Arizona Teachers, Among the Nation’s Lowest Paid, 
Threaten to Strike, WASH. POST (Mar. 29, 2018), https://washingtonpost.com/ 
news/education/wp/2018/03/29/arizona-teachers-among-the-nations-lowest 
-paid-threaten-to-strike/?utm_term=.5e00650ad401 (noting that Arizona teach-
ers were demanding a raise and restoration of school funding to pre-recession 
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school funding has shifted slightly to a greater reliance on local 
funding, which raises concerns regarding equity because of the 
disparities in funding based on local property taxes.20 In addi-
tion, numerous states are funding schools well below pre-reces-
sion levels, with Florida and Arizona providing approximately 
23% less funding, and Alabama, Georgia, Idaho, Nevada, North 
Carolina, and Oklahoma spending more than 10% less on educa-
tion.21 Teachers are experiencing the effects of less funding, both 
in their lower salaries as well as in the physical condition of their 
schools.22 
The passage of ESSA and these events raise a critical ques-
tion regarding how ESSA will impact educational equity: does 
ESSA allow states to use their new flexibility to stay on the well-
trodden road that leaves disadvantaged and minority students 
behind,23 or will ESSA help to guide states in advancing equity 
 
levels); Dana Goldstein, Teachers in Oklahoma and Kentucky Walk Out: ‘It Re-
ally Is a Wildfire’, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2018), https://nytimes.com/2018/04/02/us/ 
teacher-strikes-oklahoma-kentucky.html (“Thousands of teachers in Oklahoma 
and Kentucky walked off the job Monday morning, shutting down school dis-
tricts as they protested cuts in pay, benefits and school funding in a movement 
that has spread rapidly since igniting in West Virginia this year.”); Anita Snow 
& Terry Tang, Arizona Teachers End Walkout After Governor Signs Off on 20 
Percent Raise, CHI. TRIB. (May 3, 2018), http://chicagotribune.com/news/ 
nationworld/ct-arizona-teacher-protests-20180503-story.html (quoting the 
President of the Arizona Education Association regarding the need for contin-
ued campaigning from teachers for additional funding despite their increase in 
salary); Kalia White et al., ‘Tired of Begging’: Teacher Rebellion Shuts Down 
Oklahoma, Kentucky Schools, USA TODAY (Apr. 2, 2018), https://usatoday.com/ 
story/news/nation/2018/04/02/teacher-strikes-shut-down-schools-across 
-oklahoma-kentucky/478102002 (noting that teachers were striking in Okla-
homa to restore over $100 million in school funding that had been cut over the 
last ten years despite a pay raise). 
 20. Michael Leachman, New Census Data Show Persistent State School 
Funding Cuts, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES: OFF THE CHARTS (May 22, 
2018, 2:15 PM), https://cbpp.org/blog/new-census-data-show-persistent-state 
-school-funding-cuts. 
 21. See id. 
 22. See Gebeloff, supra note 18 (explaining the ramifications of education 
spending cuts, including teacher layoffs); Josephine Sedgwick, 25-Year-Old 
Textbooks and Holes in the Ceilings: Inside America’s Public Schools, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 16, 2018), https://nytimes.com/2018/04/16/reader-center/us-public 
-schools-conditions.html (summarizing teachers’ descriptions of the poor condi-
tions in their schools, including such comments as “[t]here are holes in the ceil-
ing, skylights don’t work, the walls need to be painted” and “I had six laptops 
for 42 fifth-grade students (in one classroom) with many broken keys and 
chargers”). 
 23. See Cynthia G. Brown, From ESEA to ESSA: Progress or Regress?, in 
THE EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT, supra note 5, at 153, 164 (arguing that 
ESSA does not support disadvantaged students). 
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for all students? Congress undeniably succeeded in designing 
ESSA to reduce federal involvement in education.24 This Article 
examines whether Congress also effectively designed ESSA to 
advance its equity goals as well as how Congress can reauthorize 
the law to more effectively advance equity. It engages with the 
ongoing scholarly debate about the potential impact of ESSA on 
equity in which some argue that ESSA can and should be used 
as a vehicle to advance equity and innovation,25 while others ex-
press great skepticism about ESSA’s ability to promote equity.26 
To begin to answer if ESSA will effectively promote equity, 
I must first define equity. Equity in education requires educa-
tional opportunities to be distributed based on students’ needs 
rather than their race, national origin, zip code, or parental in-
come levels.27 Our nation’s diverse students need a fair alloca-
tion of opportunities and resources tailored to students’ 
strengths, challenges, and vulnerabilities. Equity recognizes and 
responds to these differences rather than administers a one-size-
 
 24. See Black, supra note 3, at 1340–61; Michael Heise, From No Child Left 
Behind to Every Student Succeeds: Back to a Future for Education Federalism, 
117 COLUM. L. REV. 1859, 1872–75 (2017) (describing the limitations placed on 
the federal government by ESSA). 
 25. CHANNA M. COOK-HARVEY ET AL., LEARNING POL’Y INST., EQUITY AND 
ESSA: LEVERAGING EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY THROUGH THE EVERY STU-
DENT SUCCEEDS ACT v (2016) (“[T]he recent passage of the Every Student Suc-
ceeds Act . . . represents an opportunity for the federal government, states, dis-
tricts, and schools to equitably design education systems to ensure that the 
students who have historically been underserved by these same education sys-
tems receive an education that prepares them for the demands of the 21st cen-
tury.”); Martin R. West, The Case for ESSA: A Proper Balance, in THE EVERY 
STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT, supra note 5, at 75, 76 (“Far from a retreat from the 
federal government’s long-standing commitment to support America’s most vul-
nerable children, ESSA represents a new vision for fulfilling that commitment 
in light of the capacity and resources at its disposal.”). 
 26. See Aldeman, supra note 5, at 91, 96 (“Under ESSA, states have the 
option to identify only the absolute bottom 5 percent of schools receiving federal 
funds, leaving the remaining 95 percent of schools without any pressure to im-
prove.”); Black, supra note 3, at 1346–57 (contending that ESSA does not effec-
tively require equality in inputs or outputs); Brown, supra note 23, at 153, 164 
(“While ESSA offers some improvements, it’s mostly a missed opportunity. It’s 
weak on the training/assigning of quality teachers, . . . and financing public 
schools equitably nationwide.”). 
 27. See JAMES E. RYAN, FIVE MILES AWAY, A WORLD APART: ONE CITY, TWO 
SCHOOLS, AND THE STORY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN MODERN AMERICA 
1 (2010) (noting that educational opportunities in this nation “too often depend 
on where students live, on how much money their parents earn, or the color of 
their skin”); U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, PUBLIC EDUCATION FUNDING INEQ-
UITY IN AN ERA OF INCREASING CONCENTRATION OF POVERTY AND RESEGREGA-
TION 10 (2018) (recommending “that the federal government must take bold ac-
tion” to combat educational funding inequities in the United States). 
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fits-all model.28 It grants additional resources to the students 
with the greatest disadvantages and aims for differences in out-
comes to be based on ability.29 Equity also seeks excellence in the 
educational opportunities for all children, rather than accepting 
a leveling down to reduce disparities. Although I primarily use 
equity to encompass this definition, I also use the phrase “equal 
opportunity” as synonymous with equity. 
Equity has been and should remain a national priority in 
education for many reasons. Equity provides one of the primary 
historical and modern justifications for federal involvement in 
education.30 The last half-century reveals that Congress inter-
venes to advance equity when a constituency within U.S. society 
has been denied equal educational opportunity and when the 
states and districts show either an unwillingness or an inability 
to address these inequities.31  
Research confirms that today many economically disadvan-
taged and minority students too often receive less funding, infe-
rior teachers, less rigorous courses, and fewer resources, to name 
a few of the disparities.32 These opportunity gaps undermine the 
 
 28. See Janice Petrovich, The Shifting Terrain of Educational Policy: Why 
We Must Bring Equity Back, in BRINGING EQUITY BACK: RESEARCH FOR A NEW 
ERA IN AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL POLICY 3, 4 (Janice Petrovich & Amy Stuart 
Wells eds., 2005) (discussing the differences between equity-based reforms and 
excellence-based reforms). Thus, I am explicitly rejecting the definition of equity 
that provides all students with the exact same resources. See BENJAMIN M. SU-
PERFINE, EQUALITY IN EDUCATION LAW AND POLICY, 1954–2010, at 25 (2013) 
(noting that equity can be defined to include all students receiving the same 
resources and as all students being given the resources needed to achieve the 
same outcome). 
 29. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 27, at 51. 
 30. See MCGUINN, supra note 11, at 25, 31, 33–34 (noting historical and 
modern examples of federal intervention to advance equity in education); Bar-
one & DeBray, supra note 6, at 61, 63 (highlighting increased congressional in-
volvement in education to address denials of equal educational opportunity). 
 31. Barone & DeBray, supra note 6, at 61, 63. 
 32. See BRUCE D. BAKER ET AL., EDUC. LAW CTR., IS SCHOOL FUNDING 
FAIR?: A NATIONAL REPORT CARD 9 (7th ed. 2018) (showing funding gaps for 
high-poverty districts); IVY MORGAN & ARY AMERIKANER, THE EDUC. TR., FUND-
ING GAPS 2018: AN ANALYSIS OF FUNDING EQUITY ACROSS THE U.S. AND WITHIN 
EACH STATE 6, 10 (2018) (finding funding gaps for low-income and minority stu-
dents); U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 27, at 5, 9–10 (confirming 
lower funding and inferior opportunities for poor and minority schoolchildren); 
Linda Darling-Hammond, Inequality and School Resources: What It Will Take 
to Close the Opportunity Gap, in CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP: WHAT AMER-
ICA MUST DO TO GIVE EVERY CHILD AN EVEN CHANCE 77, 84–87 (Prudence L. 
Carter & Kevin G. Welner eds., 2013) [hereinafter CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY 
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ability of many poor and minority students to be prepared for 
colleges and careers.33 This longstanding inequitable distribu-
tion of high-quality educational resources is undermining suc-
cessful academic outcomes for poor and minority children.34 The 
National Assessment for Education Progress (NAEP), also 
known as the Nation’s Report Card, provides a comparison of 
students across the United States, in contrast to state tests that 
vary between states in rigor and cut scores. This data confirms 
the “very large” racial achievement gap and the even larger so-
cioeconomic achievement gap.35 These gaps, on average, consti-
tute approximately one and a half years of schooling.36 
Longstanding opportunity and achievement gaps along lines 
of race, national origin, and class harm our national interests in 
 
GAP: WHAT AMERICA MUST DO] (noting that minority and disadvantaged stu-
dents receive inferior teachers, fewer resources, and reduced access to high-
quality curricula). 
 33. See Kevin G. Welner & Prudence L. Carter, Achievement Gaps Arise 
from Opportunity Gaps, in CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP: WHAT AMERICA 
MUST DO, supra note 32, at 1, 2–5. 
 34. Id. at 1, 3. 
 35. See Sean F. Reardon, The Widening Academic Achievement Gap Be-
tween the Rich and the Poor: New Evidence and Possible Explanations, in 
WHITHER OPPORTUNITY?: RISING INEQUALITY, SCHOOLS, AND CHILDREN’S LIFE 
CHANCES 91, 93 (Greg J. Duncan & Richard J. Murnane eds., 2011); EDUC. OP-
PORTUNITY MONITORING PROJECT, STANFORD CTR. FOR EDUC. POLICY ANALY-
SIS, RACIAL AND ETHNIC ACHIEVEMENT GAPS, http://cepa.stanford.edu/ 
educational-opportunity-monitoring-project/achievement-gaps/race/#first (last 
visited Oct. 27, 2018); NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
THE NATION’S REPORT CARD, NAEP READING REPORT CARD: NATIONAL STU-
DENT GROUP SCORES AND SCORE GAPS (2017), https://nationsreportcard.gov/ 
reading_2017/#nation/gaps?grade=8; NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. 
DEP’T OF EDUC., THE NATION’S REPORT CARD, NAEP MATHEMATICS REPORT 
CARD: NATIONAL STUDENT GROUP SCORES AND SCORE GAPS (2017), https:// 
nationsreportcard.gov/math_2017/#nation/gaps?grade=8; NAT’L CTR. FOR 
EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., THE NATION’S REPORT CARD, NAEP 
MATHEMATICS REPORT CARD: NATIONAL STUDENT GROUP SCORES AND SCORE 
GAPS (2017), https://nationsreportcard.gov/math_2017/#nation/gaps?grade=4; 
NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., THE NATION’S REPORT 
CARD, NAEP READING REPORT CARD: NATIONAL STUDENT GROUP SCORES AND 
SCORE GAPS (2017), https://nationsreportcard.gov/reading_2017/#/nation/gaps? 
grade=4; NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., THE NATION’S 
REPORT CARD, 2015 MATHEMATICS AND READING AT GRADE 12: NATIONAL 
SCORE GAPS (2015), https://nationsreportcard.gov/reading_math_g12_2015/ 
#reading/gaps. 
 36. See Michael Hansen et al., Have We Made Progress on Achievement 
Gaps? Looking at Evidence from the New NAEP Results, BROOKINGS INST.: 
BROWN CTR. CHALKBOARD (Apr. 17, 2018), https://brookings.edu/blog/brown 
-center-chalkboard/2018/04/17/have-we-made-progress-on-achievement-gaps 
-looking-at-evidence-from-the-new-naep-results. 
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an educated democracy, a robust economy, and a just society.37 
It is axiomatic that the citizenry must be educated to govern ef-
fectively in a democracy.38 Economic estimates of the impact of 
the opportunity gap note that the failure of the United States to 
invest in economically disadvantaged children will cost the coun-
try approximately five trillion dollars over the course of their 
lives.39 This accounts for additional health care costs, criminal 
justice experiences, and the cost of failing to take full advantage 
of the talents of these children.40 In addition, if the graduation 
rate of students of color could be raised to 90%, the United States 
would add $6.6 billion annually to the economy.41 The 2018 re-
port from the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights confirms that 
high-poverty communities, who are frequently communities of 
color, often do not possess the financial means to provide quality 
schools and opportunities.42 Most importantly, students living in 
low-income households and students of color constitute more 
than half of all public school students.43 Therefore, the future of 
 
 37. See CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP, supra note 1, at 6–8 (arguing that 
growing education gaps threaten the economic and societal health of the United 
States). 
 38. See EQUITY & EXCELLENCE COMM’N, A REPORT TO THE U.S. SECRETARY 
OF EDUCATION, FOR EACH AND EVERY CHILD: A STRATEGY FOR EDUCATION EQ-
UITY AND EXCELLENCE 12 (2013) (discussing the contributions of a strong edu-
cation system to a healthy democracy). 
 39. CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP, supra note 1, at 7. 
 40. See id. at 7–8. 
 41. EQUITY & EXCELLENCE COMM’N, supra note 38, at 13–14. The 2016 
graduation rates were: African American 76.4%; Hispanic 79.3%; White 88.3%; 
American Indian/Alaska Native 71.9%; and, economically disadvantaged stu-
dents 77.6%. The graduation rate for Asian/Pacific Islander was not available 
for this year. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, PUBLIC 
HIGH SCHOOL 4-YEAR ADJUSTED COHORT GRADUATION RATE (ACGR), BY 
RACE/ETHNICITY AND SELECTED DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS FOR THE 
UNITED STATES, THE 50 STATES, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: SCHOOL YEAR 
2015–16, https://nces.ed.gov/ccd/tables/ACGR_RE_and_characteristics_2015 
-16.asp. 
 42. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 27, at 5. 
 43. See STEVE SUITTS, S. EDUC. FOUND., NEW MAJORITY RESEARCH BULLE-
TIN: LOW-INCOME STUDENTS NOW A MAJORITY IN THE NATION’S PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS (2015), http://southerneducation.org/our-strategies/research-and 
-publications/new-majority-diverse-majority-report-series/a-new-majority-2015 
-update-low-income-students-now (reporting that economically disadvantaged 
students are a majority in American public schools); Lesli A. Maxwell, U.S. 
School Enrollment Hits Majority-Minority Milestone, EDUC. WK. (Aug. 19, 
2014), https://edweek.org/ew/articles/2014/08/20/01demographics.h34.html (re-
porting that students of color now constitute the majority of students in public 
schools). 
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the nation depends upon fully developing the talents and abili-
ties of poor and minority students. 
This Article offers my model for institutional design to 
achieve an equitable education. This model embraces four ele-
ments: fair funding for schools, an equitable distribution of effec-
tive teachers, equitable access to high-quality preK-12 learning 
opportunities, and integrated school settings.44 These elements 
are drawn from research regarding the critical components of ef-
fective education reform as well as my experience in education 
law and policy for over two decades. My model embraces the 
premise that the best model for equity must incorporate research 
on impactful education reform while acknowledging political and 
practical feasibility and parsimony. As discussed in detail below, 
these elements work synergistically to advance educational eq-
uity. 
This Article shows that even though ESEA was passed in 
part to bridge the opportunity and achievement gaps for disad-
vantaged and minority students and to support improvements to 
education,45 ESSA will not provide sufficient support and incen-
tives for states to achieve these goals. Fortunately, ESSA only 
provides appropriations through fiscal year 2020,46 and thus, 
lawmakers will soon begin to examine the law’s effectiveness 
and possible reforms as reauthorization approaches. Indeed, 
lawmakers are already keeping very close tabs on ESSA as evi-
denced by the numerous hearings about implementation47 and 
 
 44. Research on the benefits of each of these building blocks is provided in 
Part II. 
 45. MCGUINN, supra note 11, at 31 (“ESEA was premised on the idea that 
the federal government should intervene in . . . an educational crisis among 
poor and minority children.”).  
 46. 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2016). 
 47. Congress has held eleven hearings on ESSA implementation since its 
passage in December 2015. Every Student Succeeds Act: States Leading the Way: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions, 115th Cong. 
(2018); ESSA Implementation: Exploring State and Local Reform Efforts: Hear-
ing Before the H. Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce, 115th Cong. (2017); Sup-
planting the Law and Local Education Authority through Regulatory Fiat: Hear-
ing Before the Subcomm. on Early Childhood, Elementary, & Secondary Educ. 
of the H. Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce, 114th Cong. (2016); ESSA Imple-
mentation: Perspectives from Education Stakeholders on Proposed Regulations: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ. Labor, & Pensions, 114th Cong. 
(2016); ESSA Implementation: Update from the U.S. Secretary of Education on 
Proposed Regulations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor & 
Pensions, 114th Cong. (2016); Next Steps in K-12 Education: Examining Recent 
Efforts to Implement the Every Student Succeeds Act: Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce, 114th Cong. (2016); ESSA Implementation: 
Perspectives from Education Stakeholders: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
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Congress’s decision to disapprove the U.S. Department of Edu-
cation’s (DOE) final regulations for the law.48 Therefore, this Ar-
ticle proposes a timely, comprehensive plan to guide the rapidly 
approaching reauthorization. 
This Article also contends that when Congress reauthorizes 
ESEA, it should adopt an incremental approach for reform that 
incentivizes and supports states in providing the essential ele-
ments of an equitable education.49 This incremental approach 
involves gradual shifts to education federalism that would ulti-
mately result in a more balanced federal-state partnership for 
education that would expand state and local education capacity 
for education reform.50 This partnership would embrace the fed-
eral government as the final guarantor of equitable access to an 
excellent education, while giving states and localities significant 
latitude on how equity should be implemented at the state and 
local levels.51 These incremental reforms would disrupt ESSA’s 
anemic approach to equity.  
This Article builds upon my past scholarship in two princi-
pal ways. First, it assumes that a restructuring of education fed-
eralism will be necessary to advance equitable access to an ex-
cellent education.52 As I have demonstrated in prior work, 
 
Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions, 114th Cong. (2016); ESSA Implementation in 
States and School Districts: Perspectives from the U.S. Secretary of Education: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions, 114th Cong. 
(2016); Next Steps for K-12 Education: Upholding the Letter and Intent of the 
Every Student Succeeds Act: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Educ. & the Work-
force, 114th Cong. (2016); ESSA Implementation in States and School Districts: 
Perspectives from Education Leaders: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, 
Educ., Labor, & Pensions, 114th Cong. (2016); Next Steps for K-12 Education: 
Implementing the Promise to Restore State and Local Control: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Early Childhood, Elementary, & Secondary Educ. of the H. 
Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce, 114th Cong. (2016).  
 48. Congressional Disapproval of Department of Education Rule, Pub. L. 
No. 115-13, 131 Stat. 77 (2017); 81 Fed. Reg. 86,076 (Nov. 29, 2016). 
 49. I recently proposed policy reforms for school funding that enact incre-
mental shifts to education federalism. Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, No Quick 
Fix for Equity and Excellence: The Virtues of Incremental Shifts in Education 
Federalism, 27 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 201 (2016). 
 50. See Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Disrupting Education Federalism, 92 
WASH. U. L. REV. 959, 1004–05, 1015 (2015). 
 51. Id. at 1005, 1015 (arguing that education federalism would expand the 
capacity of states to implement equitable policies). I apply my theory of educa-
tion federalism from Disrupting Education Federalism in Kimberly Jenkins 
Robinson, Fisher’s Cautionary Tale and the Urgent Need for Equal Access to an 
Excellent Education, 130 HARV. L. REV. 185, 223–38 (2016). 
 52. Robinson, supra note 50, at 983–1017. 
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federalism has served as a roadblock to equal educational oppor-
tunity and must be restructured to achieve greater equity and 
excellence in education.53 Second, I build on my prior proposal 
for an incremental restructuring of education federalism that 
would gradually shift the balance of federal-state power over ed-
ucation to embrace federal policymaking strengths while retain-
ing primary state and local control over education.54 
Federal leadership, law, and policy will be necessary to en-
able states to fulfill their recent pledge to make educational eq-
uity a reality for all schoolchildren.55 My emphasis on the need 
for an incremental restructuring of education federalism distin-
guishes my work from other ESSA scholarship. I recommend a 
unique combination of law and policy levers that strategically 
employ federal incentives, conditions, and mandates. This is in 
contrast to most proposals for ESEA reauthorization that solely 
focus on new conditions for federal education funds. Also, this 
Article presents my model for institutional design for educa-
tional equity that draws together a substantial body of research 
on the key components of an equitable and excellent education. 
Part I describes ESSA with an emphasis on its approach to 
equity and contrasts it with its predecessor, No Child Left Be-
hind. Part II analyzes why ESSA’s approach to equity will prove 
ineffective. Part III recommends how ESEA should be reauthor-
ized by incrementally restructuring education federalism in 
ways that would promote equitable access to an excellent educa-
tion for all children. 
I.  UNDERSTANDING THE EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS 
ACT   
President Johnson signed ESEA into law in 1965 as part of 
his broader “war on poverty” because he viewed education as an 
essential ingredient for mobility, and he acknowledged that 
many schools did not have adequate resources to provide essen-
tial skills to children from low-income families.56 Title I of ESEA 
directs additional funding to disadvantaged students and was 
 
 53. Id. at 972–83; Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The High Cost of Education 
Federalism, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 287, 293–305, 307–14, 322–30 (2013). 
 54. Robinson, supra note 49, at 220–37. 
 55. See THE ASPEN INST. EDUC. & SOC’Y PROGRAM, supra note 8 (discussing 
state implementation strategies to promote educational equity); Burnette II, su-
pra note 8 (reporting the meeting of state education chiefs to strategize policies 
regarding educational equity). 
 56. MCGUINN, supra note 11, at 29. 
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included as the primary vehicle to address the needs of these 
students.57 With the passage of the Improving America’s Schools 
Act of 1994, the aim of the legislation broadened to include high 
achievement for all students, and this expansion ushered in fed-
eral support for the standards and accountability movement.58 
Both No Child Left Behind and ESSA embraced this broader fo-
cus.59 
Despite this larger aim, funding under ESEA, particularly 
under Title I, still aims to reduce the adverse effects of poverty 
on educational opportunities and outcomes. Title I is the center-
piece of the law and serves as the largest federal education aid 
to communities with substantial numbers of schoolchildren liv-
ing in poverty, even as the broader goal of improved achievement 
for all students has gained ascendancy.60 For instance, ESSA, 
like No Child Left Behind, requires test scores to be disaggre-
gated by economic status and race61 to shine a spotlight on 
whether schools, districts, and states are meeting the needs of 
poor and minority students. Also like its predecessor, ESSA 
obliges districts to intervene when these students are perform-
ing poorly and to institute efforts to close the achievement gap 
between these students and their more affluent peers.62 There-
fore, even though ESSA increases state autonomy for education 
reform under ESEA, it remains worthwhile to assess the effec-
tiveness of ESSA in improving the education of disadvantaged 
 
 57. See id. at 31. 
 58. See id. at 95–97. 
 59. See id. at 179; Charles Barone, What ESSA Says: Continuities and De-
partures, in THE EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT, supra note 5, at 59–66. 
 60. See STEPHEN Q. CORNMAN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, 
REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES FOR PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY ED-
UCATION: SCHOOL YEAR 2014–15 (FISCAL YEAR 2015) 18–19 (2018); Eloise Pa-
sachoff, Conditional Spending After NFIB v. Sebelius: The Example of Federal 
Education Law, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 577, 614, 623 (2013). But see Derek Black, 
Leveraging Funding for Equity and Integration, in THE ENDURING LEGACY OF 
RODRIGUEZ: CREATING NEW PATHWAYS TO EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 
227, 229–31 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Kimberly Jenkins Robinson eds., 2015) 
[hereinafter Black, Leveraging Funding] [hereinafter THE ENDURING LEGACY 
OF RODRIGUEZ] (observing that a gradual shift in focus towards general educa-
tional reform has made Title I funds “no longer targeted or conditional in any 
meaningful sense”). 
 61. No Child Left Behind, 20 U.S.C. § 6311 (b)(3)(C)(xiii) (2012) (repealed 
2015); Every Student Succeeds Act, 20 U.S.C. § 6311 (b)(2)(B)(xi)(I) & (II) 
(2016). 
 62. No Child Left Behind, 20 U.S.C. § 6316 (b)(1)(A), (3–5), (7), (8) (2012) 
(repealed 2015); Every Student Succeeds Act, 20 U.S.C. § 6311 (d)(2)(B) (2016). 
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and minority students because this aim remains a goal of this 
bipartisan law. 
ESEA is comprised of many programs with a wide variety of 
aims, including programs to support neglected63 and migrant 
children,64 language instruction for English learners,65 and sup-
port for the education of Native American children.66 Title I is 
the largest program within ESEA, contains the major require-
ments of the law, and aims to support education of the disadvan-
taged.67 Title I includes 59% of ESEA’s funding at $16.4 billion 
per year for fiscal year 2018.68 
This Part briefly summarizes the key components of No 
Child Left Behind before describing ESSA’s key requirements. 
Understanding No Child Left Behind is essential for under-
standing ESSA because ESSA retains some of the same condi-
tions as No Child Left Behind. Section A also highlights some of 
the strengths and challenges that No Child Left Behind encoun-
tered. This research helps readers better understand ESSA. Sec-
tion B explains the key requirements for ESSA. 
A. THE NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT OF 2001 
No Child Left Behind ushered in the largest increase in fed-
eral involvement in the public schools in the nation’s history.69 
No Child Left Behind aimed to reduce both achievement and op-
portunity gaps.70 The focus of No Child Left Behind’s accounta-
bility structures included the condition that states must imple-
ment “challenging” academic standards in math, reading, and 
 
 63. Every Student Succeeds Act, 20 U.S.C. § 6421 (2016). 
 64. Id. § 6391. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. § 7401. Although many of the students in each of these programs 
are also poor or minorities, examination of the effectiveness of ESEA to help 
address the specific needs of these student groups is beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
 67. See Barone, supra note 59, at 59–60; Pasachoff, supra note 60, at 614. 
 68. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION FISCAL YEAR 
2018 CONGRESSIONAL ACTION (2018), https://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/ 
budget/budget18/18action.pdf. 
 69. See MCGUINN, supra note 11, at 194–95. 
 70. See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, § 1001, 115 
Stat. 1425, 1439 (2002) (noting that No Child Left Behind seeks “to close the 
achievement gap with accountability, flexibility, and choice, so that no child is 
left behind” and “to ensure that all children have a fair, equal, and significant 
opportunity to obtain a high-quality education and reach, at a minimum, profi-
ciency on challenging State academic achievement standards and state aca-
demic assessments”).  
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science for all students.71 All schools, not just schools that re-
ceived Title I funding,72 were required to administer annual 
math and reading tests aligned to these standards beginning in 
the 2005–06 school year for third through eighth grade and once 
in tenth through twelfth grades.73 Science testing began in the 
2007–08 school year and occurred three times in third through 
twelfth grades.74 Each state determined a proficient score and 
published an annual state report card with proficiency scores 
disaggregated by student economic disadvantage, gender, major 
racial and ethnic groups, disabled students, and English lan-
guage learners.75 Schools and districts also had to publish 
whether students were making adequate yearly progress toward 
the goal of proficiency for all students by 2014.76 States exercised 
complete discretion over the standards because No Child Left 
Behind prohibited any requirement that states submit state 
standards to the Secretary of Education.77  
Schools that received Title I funding were subject to ac-
countability measures that became increasingly interventionist 
as the number of years increased that the school did not achieve 
adequate yearly progress. Schools were identified as in need of 
improvement and provided with technical assistance after miss-
ing adequate yearly progress for any group of students for one 
year; then students received the ability to transfer to another 
school within the district after two consecutive years of the 
school failing to make adequate yearly progress; and, after three 
consecutive years of not making adequate yearly progress stu-
dents could receive tutoring. Finally, a school had to undertake 
corrective action after four consecutive years of failing to make 
adequate yearly progress and underwent restructuring after five 
consecutive years of failing to make adequate yearly progress.78 
 
 71. See No Child Left Behind, 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(1)(A)–(C) (2012) (re-
pealed 2015). 
 72. See James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left Behind 
Act, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 942 (2004). 
 73. See No Child Left Behind, 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(3)(A)–(C) (2012) (re-
pealed 2015). 
 74. Science testing occurred once in third through fifth grade, once in sixth 
to ninth grade, and once in tenth through twelfth grades. See No Child Left 
Behind, 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(3)(C)(v)(II) (2012) (repealed 2015). 
 75. See id. § 6311(b)(3)(C)(xiii) (2012) (repealed 2015). 
 76. See id. § 6311(b)(2)(F), (h)(1)(C)(v) (2012) (repealed 2015). 
 77. See id. § 6311(b)(1)(A) (2012) (repealed 2015). 
 78. See 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(1)(A) (2012) (repealed 2015); id. § 6316(a)(1), 
(b)(1)(A), (5), (7), (8) (one year requirements); id. § 6316(b)(7)(C) (two year re-
quirements); id. § 6316(b)(5) (three year requirements); id. § 6316(b)(7) (four 
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No Child Left Behind sought to close an opportunity gap by 
requiring that Title I schools employ highly qualified teachers 
for all subjects by 2005–06.79 For non-Title I schools, teachers of 
“core academic subjects” were required to be highly qualified by 
2005–06.80 A highly qualified teacher was required to have 
earned a bachelor’s degree, possess subject matter competency, 
and either have state certification or have passed a state licens-
ing exam that provided a license to teach.81 States had to ensure 
that inexperienced, unqualified, or out-of-field teachers did not 
teach poor and minority schoolchildren at higher rates than 
other children.82  
Although many criticize No Child Left Behind as being mis-
guided federal education policy,83 it did spark some important 
improvements to education. The law included a significant in-
crease in federal funding for education: in 2002 spending was at 
$56.2 billion, which was a $14.1 billion increase from 2001.84 All 
states now have standards and assessments aligned to state 
standards.85 Although most states had standards and tests be-
fore No Child Left Behind, only thirteen tested reading and math 
annually and even fewer had robust approaches to accountabil-
ity.86 The goal for all students to achieve proficiency on state 
tests by 2014 was unattainable due to disparities in opportuni-
ties to learn as well as student ability.87 However, No Child Left 
Behind succeeded in ensuring that states adopted an assessment 
regime that informed parents and the public about how students 
and subgroups of students were performing in every public 
 
year requirements); id. § 6316(b)(8) (five year requirements). 
 79. See id. § 6319(a) (2012) (repealed 2015). 
 80. See id. § 6319(a)(2) (2012) (repealed 2015). “Core academic subjects” in-
clude a wide range of subjects including math, science, reading, language arts, 
foreign languages, government, history, arts, and geography. See Improving the 
Academic Achievement of the Disadvantaged, 34 C.F.R. § 200.55 (2003). 
 81. See No Child Left Behind, 20 U.S.C. § 7801(23)(A)–(C) (2012) (repealed 
2015). 
 82. See id. § 6311(b)(8)(C) (2012) (repealed 2015). 
 83. See, e.g., David L. Kirp, Why the New Education Law Is Good for Chil-
dren Left Behind, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/ 
12/10/opinion/why-the-new-education-law-is-good-for-children-left-behind 
.html. 
 84. Patrick McGuinn, From ESEA to NCLB: The Growth of the Federal Role 
and the Shift to Accountability, in THE EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT, supra 
note 5, at 13, 25. 
 85. See RYAN, supra note 27, at 244. 
 86. See MCGUINN, supra note 11, at 182. 
 87. See Black, supra note 3, at 1324–26. 
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school. This information had not previously been available. Fur-
thermore, while many schools and districts had learned to toler-
ate low student performance, by attaching consequences to low 
performance, No Child Left Behind required educators to take 
focused action to raise student achievement.88 
Nevertheless, No Child Left Behind fell short of many of its 
aims. It attempted to provide alternative school options for those 
schools that did not make adequate yearly progress. However, 
parents rarely exercised their school choice options because some 
parents did not know of, or were not interested in, other schools 
and some districts did not have enough successful schools to of-
fer.89 Although some expected that No Child Left Behind’s sanc-
tions would fall primarily on urban schools, as time went on, 
growing numbers of middle class, mostly white suburban schools 
were identified as in need of improvement.90 In addition, those 
states with strong standards had higher rates of school failure, 
while those with lower standards had fewer failures.91 This cre-
ated perverse incentives to lower cut scores and standards.92 
Eventually, as more and more schools entered improvement 
and it was clear that the 2014 proficiency goal was unattainable, 
states began to request waivers from No Child Left Behind’s con-
ditions from the DOE.93 To receive a waiver, states were required 
to adopt college and career ready standards and to measure stu-
dent growth on high-quality assessments at least once in grades 
three to eight and once in high school for math and reading.94 
 
 88. No Child Left Behind, 20 U.S.C. § 6311 (b)(2)(A)(iii) (2012) (repealed 
2015) (“Each state plan shall . . . include sanctions and rewards, such as bonuses 
and recognition, the State will use to hold local educational agencies and public 
elementary schools and secondary schools accountable for student achievement 
and for ensuring that they make adequate yearly progress.”); see also REBECCA 
R. SKINNER & LEAH ROSENSTIEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44898, HISTORY OF 
THE ESEA TITLE I-A FORMULAS 41 (2017) (summarizing changes No Child Left 
Behind made to grant funding and state accountability requirements, and new 
requirements, including for the qualifications of teachers). 
 89. See RYAN, supra note 27, at 191. 
 90. See Jeffrey R. Henig et al., From NCLB to ESSA: Lessons Learned or 
Politics Reaffirmed?, in THE EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT, supra note 5, at 
29, 33. 
 91. See id. 
 92. Ryan, supra note 72, at 934. 
 93. See Patrick McGuinn, Incentives and Inducements: The Feds Fight Fed-
eralism, in BUSH-OBAMA SCHOOL REFORM: LESSONS LEARNED 51, 59–61 (Fred-
erick M. Hess & Michael Q. McShane eds., 2018). 
 94. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., ESEA FLEXIBILITY 1 (2012), https://www2.ed 
.gov/policy/elsec/guid/esea-flexibility/index.html. 
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The standards requirement for waivers was viewed as an unwel-
come federal push toward the Common Core Standards, which 
are a set of rigorous standards developed by academics and as-
sessment specialists in response to a request from the National 
Governors Association and the Council of Chief State School Of-
ficers.95 DOE permitted states to set new “ambitious but achiev-
able . . . annual measurable objectives” that would guide school 
improvement efforts and to publish performance on school report 
cards.96 The waivers released states from the interventions pre-
scribed in No Child Left Behind, but states were required to in-
tervene in the bottom 5% of schools.97 The waivers also released 
districts from having to employ highly qualified teachers, and 
instead, states were required to evaluate teachers based in part 
on student growth on assessments.98 The waivers retained the 
requirement that states ensure that poorly qualified teachers did 
not teach low-income and minority students at higher rates than 
other children.99 Forty-three states, the District of Columbia, 
and Puerto Rico received waivers from No Child Left Behind.100 
ESEA waivers ultimately sowed seeds of discontent on the left 
and the right, and it was this widespread discontentment that 
led to passage of ESSA.101 
B. THE EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT 
When President Obama signed the Every Student Succeeds 
Act (ESSA) into law, lawmakers on both sides of the political 
spectrum as well as state leaders and educators celebrated the 
passage of a bipartisan law.102 ESEA was more than seven years 
 
 95. See Frederick M. Hess & Max Eden, Introduction, in THE EVERY STU-
DENT SUCCEEDS ACT, supra note 5, at 1, 7; Elaine McArdle, What Happened to 
the Common Core?, HARV. EDUC. MAG (Sept. 3, 2014), https://gse.harvard.edu/ 
news/ed/14/09/what-happened-common-core; Frequently Asked Questions, COM-
MON CORE ST. STANDARDS INITIATIVE, http://corestandards.org/about-the 
-standards/frequently-asked-questions (last visited Oct. 27, 2018). 
 96. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., ESEA FLEXIBILITY 1–2 (2012), https://www2 
.ed.gov/policy/elsec/guid/esea-flexibility/index.html.  
 97. See id. at 1, 6. 
 98. See id. at 2. 
 99. See id.  
 100. See id. at 1–2.  
 101. Henig et al., supra note 90, at 29, 39–40. On the right, Republicans 
charged the Obama administration with federal overreach into an area of state 
and local control. On the left, the administration’s emphasis on school choice 
and the rapid implementation of the Common Core standards by some states as 
their chosen method for implementing college- and career-ready standards led 
many teachers unions to oppose No Child Left Behind and the waivers. See id. 
 102. See Hess & Eden, supra note 95, at 1; Klein, supra note 17, at 43, 57. 
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overdue for reauthorization, and ESSA escaped the partisan 
gridlock that had blocked other legislation.103 Republicans her-
alded the substantial reduction in federal involvement in educa-
tion, while Democrats emphasized the guardrails that limited 
state and district discretion and kept a civil rights emphasis on 
the needs of disadvantaged and minority students.104 This Sec-
tion notes the key requirements for ESSA with an emphasis on 
its requirements relating to equity. 
At the outset, it is worth noting that ESSA sometimes 
merely requires disclosure of important data that might reveal 
an opportunity or achievement gap and at other times it requires 
both disclosure and that the gap be addressed. Part II analyzes 
why neither approach is successful in ESSA. 
1. ESSA on Standards and Testing 
ESSA requires states to maintain “challenging” academic 
content standards that are aligned to the requirements to enter 
colleges as well as career and technical education in the state.105 
ESSA retains the No Child Left Behind testing regime for math, 
reading, and science.106 The results of the assessments must be 
disaggregated at the school, district, and state level by major ra-
cial and ethnic groups, economic disadvantage, disability, Eng-
lish proficiency status, gender, and migrant status.107 
ESSA provides states the flexibility to establish their own 
long-term goals that include student proficiency on state tests, 
English language proficiency, and high school graduation 
rates.108 States must choose four indicators for the accountabil-
ity system, including three academic indicators: proficiency on 
state tests, proficiency in English, and student growth in ele-
mentary and middle schools or graduation rates in high 
schools.109 These indicators in aggregate must weigh much more 
 
 103. See Klein, supra note 17, at 43, 57.  
 104. See id. at 54–55, 57.  
 105. See 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(1)(A), (D) (2016). 
 106. The math and reading assessments must be administered annually in 
grades three to eight and once in high school, while the science assessments 
must be administered at least once in grades three to five, six to nine, and ten 
through twelve. Id. § 6311(b)(2)(B). 
 107. See id. § 6311(b)(2)(B)(xi). ESSA allows States to administer alternative 
assessments to students with severe disabilities as long as the percentage of 
students taking such assessments does not exceed 1%. Id. § 6311(b)(2)(D)(i). 
 108. See id. § 6311(c)(4)(A). 
 109. ESSA adopted new standards for English language learners that are 
aimed to help them attain English proficiency. See 20 U.S.C. § 6311 (c)(4)(B) 
(Supp. IV 2016); Barone, supra note 59, at 61. 
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than the fourth indicator.110 The fourth indicator assesses 
“school quality or student success” and can include such factors 
as the engagement of students or educators, the opportunity to 
attend and completion of advanced courses, readiness for post-
secondary opportunities, and school safety and climate.111 All re-
sults from state assessments must be shared in a comprehensive 
review of academic performance for each school and district that 
is concise and comprehensible by the public.112 In addition, indi-
vidual student report cards must include a student’s perfor-
mance on state assessments and the report cards must allow 
parents, teachers, and school leaders to understand a student’s 
academic performance and assess the needs of the student.113 
2. ESSA on Accountability 
ESSA identifies four categories of schools for intervention. 
Beginning at least once every three school years after the 2017–
18 school year, a state must identify schools for “comprehensive 
support and improvement” if they are among the lowest 5% on 
performance in the state of those that receive ESSA funding or 
are a public high school in which one third or more of the stu-
dents fail to graduate.114 When a subgroup of students at a school 
consistently underperforms as defined by each state, ESSA re-
quires states to identify the school for targeted support and im-
provement.115 ESSA requires additional targeted support and 
improvement when a subgroup of students tests in the bottom 
5% of students.116 
ESSA eliminated the school interventions required by No 
Child Left Behind. In their place, ESSA requires that when a 
school is in need of comprehensive support and improvement, 
the district must partner with stakeholders to develop a plan to 
improve performance on state indicators that responds to an as-
sessment of needs in the school; adopts “evidence-based inter-
ventions;”117 and, identifies any inequities in resources that the 
 
 110. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(c)(4)(B), (C)(ii) (2016). 
 111. Id. § 6311(c)(4)(B)(v)(I)–(II). 
 112. Id. § 6311(h)(1)(A)–(B). 
 113. Id. § 6311(b)(2)(B)(x). 
 114. Id. § 6311(c)(4)(D). 
 115. Id. § 6311(d)(2)(A), (B). 
 116. Id. § 6311(d)(2)(C). 
 117. Although the requirement that interventions be “evidence-based” could 
strengthen the quality of school interventions, education law scholar Eloise Pa-
sachoff provides a compelling analysis of why this requirement may not achieve 
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plan will address.118 The school, district, and state must approve 
the plan and the state must periodically monitor and review the 
plan.119 If, in no more than four years, the school has not met 
state-defined criteria for progress, the state must intervene with 
“more rigorous . . . action” that may involve changing operations 
at the school level.120 When a school is identified for targeted 
support and improvement or additional targeted support and in-
tervention due to a low-performing subgroup, the school must 
develop a plan that meets similar criteria and that is approved 
and monitored by the district.121 The district must follow up with 
additional action if improvement is not made in the timeframe 
set by the state.122 
3. ESSA on Resource Equity, Teacher Quality, and DOE 
Oversight 
ESSA contains numerous requirements that Congress in-
cluded to shine a light on disparities in educational opportunity. 
For example, ESSA requires reporting on disparities in fund-
ing.123 In state report cards, state plans must include, for each 
district and school, per-pupil spending of federal, state, and local 
funds, including actual personnel spending, by source of 
funds.124 Districts also must publish per-pupil spending by 
school.125 
ESSA also requires districts and states to report the number 
and percentage of students enrolled in early childhood programs, 
dual enrollment programs, as well as advanced coursework that 
 
the hoped-for results. In short, she contends that the evidence-based require-
ments in ESSA do not significantly constrain policy choices, underestimate im-
plementation challenges, and overlook the significant disagreements on what to 
do. Eloise Pasachoff, Two Cheers for Evidence: Law, Research, and Values in 
Education Policymaking and Beyond, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1933, 1936–37 
(2017). 
 118. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(d)(1)(B) (2016). 
 119. Id. § 6311(d)(1)(B)(v)–(vi). 
 120. Id. § 6311(d)(3)(A). 
 121. Id. § 6311(d)(2)(B). 
 122. Id. § 6311(d)(2)(B)(v), (C). 
 123. Id. § 6311(h)(1)(C)(x). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. § 6311(h)(2)(C). These provisions will not take effect until the report 
cards for the 2018–19 school year due to a one-year extension on compliance 
from the DOE. Jason Botel, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.: OFFICE OF ELEMENTARY & 
SECONDARY EDUC. (June 28, 2017), https://www.ed.gov/policy/elsec/leg/essa/ 
perpupilreqltr.pdf. 
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earns college credit while in high school.126 In addition, states 
and districts must publish data on school climate measures such 
as in-school and out-of-school suspensions, school-related ar-
rests, and incidents of bullying, harassment, and violence.127 
ESSA maintains the prior Title I funding formulas.128 ESSA 
retained the longstanding requirement that Title I and non-Title 
I schools must maintain comparable resources.129 ESSA made 
only minor adjustments to the supplement-not-supplant require-
ment that prohibits federal funds from supplanting rather than 
supplementing state and local funds and the maintenance of ef-
fort requirement that attempts to prevent states and districts 
from lowering support for public schools.130 
ESSA requires that states both disclose inequities in the 
qualifications of teachers as well as remedy these inequities.131 
ESSA eliminates the No Child Left Behind requirement that all 
schools must employ highly qualified teachers and does not re-
quire states to evaluate teachers based on student performance 
as the No Child Left Behind waivers demanded.132 Instead, 
ESSA merely requires that teachers be certified as defined by 
state standards.133 States and districts must publicly report the 
qualifications of teachers, including disaggregating this data by 
high- and low-poverty schools, as well as the number and per-
 
 126. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(h)(1)(C)(viii)(II) (2016). 
 127. Id. § 6311(h)(1)(C)(viii)(I). 
 128. Id. §§ 6333–39. ESSA does direct additional funds to rural schools 
through Title II. See SKINNER & ROSENSTIEL, supra note 88, at 45 (“[A]lmost all 
of the changes to the Title I-A formulas were removed in conference. One nota-
ble change made by the ESSA was an increase in the set-aside for the Bureau 
of Indian Education (BIE) and Outlying Areas from 1.0% to 1.1%, provided the 
total amount available for state grants would not be less than the amount avail-
able in FY2016.”). 
 129. 20 U.S.C. § 6321(c)(1)(B) (2016). 
 130. Id. § 6321(b); see SKINNER & ROSENSTIEL, supra note 88, at 45 & n.273; 
Black, supra note 3, at 1339; Michael Casserly, ESSA and Urban Public 
Schools: Ambivalence and Opportunity, in THE EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT, 
supra note 5, at 137, 142.  
 131. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(h)(1)(C)(ix). 
 132. Every Student Succeeds Act, Pub. L. No. 114-95, § 1001(1), 129 Stat. 
1802, 1814 (2015) (repealing 20 U.S.C. § 6319(a)); see U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
ESEA FLEXIBILITY, https://ed.gov/policy/elsec/guid/esea-flexibility/index.html 
(last modified May 12, 2018) (describing the waiver process under NCLB); Ash-
ley Jochim, ESSA and State Policy: What’s Next for Education Policy?, in THE 
EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT, supra note 5, at 121, 131.  
 133. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(g)(2)(J) (2016). 
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centage of teachers who are inexperienced, teaching with provi-
sional or emergency credentials, and out-of-field teachers.134 
ESSA also requires states to implement plans to ensure that low-
income and minority students are not disproportionately taught 
by “ineffective, out-of-field, or inexperienced teachers.”135 This 
provision requires the state plan to identify how it will evaluate 
and report to the public its progress on achieving this goal.136 No 
Child Left Behind included a similar provision.137 
Title II of ESSA provides grants to states to raise the quality 
of teachers, principals, and school leaders and their effectiveness 
at improving student achievement, as well as to improve the eq-
uitable distribution of teachers.138 Most of the funding is passed 
directly to districts and the DOE also receives funds under Title 
II.139 The state grants may support a wide range of activities to 
improve teacher quality, including reforming teacher certifica-
tion, licensure or tenure requirements; supporting districts in 
designing teacher and principal evaluation systems that include 
student growth; and, improving the equitable distribution of ef-
fective teachers, among other activities.140 
ESSA explicitly limits the authority of the Secretary of Ed-
ucation in response to concerns that Secretary Arne Duncan 
overreached when he issued waivers to No Child Left Behind 
that contained numerous terms that sought to accomplish Pres-
ident Obama’s education agenda.141 For instance, ESSA auto-
matically approves state plans unless the Secretary notifies a 
 
 134. Id. § 6311(h)(1)(C)(ix). 
 135. Id. § 6311(g)(1)(B). 
 136. Id.; § 6311(b)(8)(C) (noting that state plans must include “the specific 
steps the State educational agency will take to ensure that both schoolwide pro-
grams and targeted assistance schools provide instruction by highly qualified 
instructional staff as required by sections 6314(b)(1)(C) and 6315(c)(1)(E) of this 
title, including steps that the State educational agency will take to ensure that 
poor and minority children are not taught at higher rates than other children 
by inexperienced, unqualified, or out-of-field teachers, and the measures that 
the State educational agency will use to evaluate and publicly report the pro-
gress of the State educational agency with respect to such steps”); 
 137. No Child Left Behind, 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(8)(C) (2012) (repealed 2015). 
 138. See id. § 6601.  
 139. See id. § 6603(a)–(b) (authorizing appropriations to states and local ed-
ucation agencies and then national activities); Alyson Klein et al., A Guide to 
State ESSA Plans: Goals, Teacher Quality, and More, EDUC. WK. (Oct. 2, 2017), 
https://edweek.org/ew/section/multimedia/a-guide-to-state-essa-plans-goals 
-teacher-quality.html. 
 140. See 20 U.S.C. § 6611(c)(4)(B)(i)–(iii) (2016). 
 141. Id. § 6311(e)(1)(B); Henig et al., supra note 90, at 38–39. For an argu-
ment that Secretary Duncan exceeded his authority in issuing the waivers, 
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state within 120 days of submission of the plan that the plan is 
not in compliance with the law.142 The Secretary also is prohib-
ited from influencing states to adopt the Common Core Stand-
ards,143 directing or controlling a school’s curriculum or program 
of instruction,144 or providing support for the development of a 
national test in reading, math or any other subject, including a 
test aligned to the Common Core.145 
Despite the broad aims of ESSA and its desire to increase 
state autonomy for implementing education reforms, it retains 
the goal of improving outcomes for economically disadvantaged 
and minority students as well as greater equity in education 
within the aims of the law.146 The next Part presents my model 
for the institutional design of equitable schools, which includes 
four building blocks for meeting the needs of disadvantaged and 
minority students. It then analyzes how ESSA will fall short of 
achieving its aims for enhancing outcomes for these students 
and promoting equity because it does not provide states and dis-
tricts the appropriate incentives and supports to provide these 
building blocks. 
II.  HOW ESSA MISSES THE MARK FOR EQUITY   
The United States today is creating, tolerating, and reinforc-
ing growing opportunity gaps. Children from different socioeco-
nomic statuses and races too often live in separate and unequal 
worlds.147 The most powerful federal response to educational in-
equities, ESEA, will not be the catalyst that is needed to guide 
states in remedying these disparities. ESSA is not effectively de-
signed to provide states the incentives that are needed to ensure 
that they provide disadvantaged and minority students equita-
ble access to an excellent education. 
This Part provides my model for institutional design of an 
equitable education, which aims to provide excellent educational 
opportunities for all students. It includes four building blocks for 
meeting the needs of disadvantaged and minority students: fair 
 
please see Derek W. Black, Federalizing Education by Waiver?, 68 VAND. L. 
REV. 607 (2015). 
 142. 20 U.S.C. §§ 6311(a)(4)(A)(v), 7871(a) (2016). 
 143. Id. §§ 6311(j), 7906a(a). 
 144. Id. § 7907(a). 
 145. Id. § 7909. 
 146. Id. § 6301. 
 147. CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP, supra note 1, at 3–4; U.S. COMM’N ON 
CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 27, at 5.  
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funding, an equitable distribution of effective teachers, high-
quality preK-12 opportunities to learn, and economic and racial 
integration. Disparities within each of these building blocks sub-
stantially contribute to opportunity gaps.148 Each Section begins 
with research showing that these building blocks are not being 
provided and why this matters to the success of disadvantaged 
students. Each Section then critiques how ESSA fails to offer 
sufficient incentives and support for providing these critical 
building blocks. 
My model for institutional design for equity differs from 
ESSA’s approach to equity in numerous ways. My model seeks 
to remedy the root causes of the opportunity gaps that lead to 
achievement gaps in ways that ESSA does not. Rather than in-
cluding conditions that insist that states address such essential 
foundations for equity as fair funding and high-quality preK-12 
resources, ESSA mostly focuses on exposing achievement gaps 
and telling states to fix these symptoms of the broken foundation 
of our education system.149 When ESSA does attempt to remedy 
aspects of the opportunity gap, such as teacher quality or dispar-
ities in resources, the flawed design and limited enforcement 
ability of the DOE will make these requirements ineffectual.150 
My model also offers a comprehensive approach to education 
reforms to achieve educational equity that ESSA lacks. Instead 
of taking on the critical design flaws of the nation’s education 
system, ESSA tinkers at the margins of reform in ways that will 
not ignite lasting change. Unlike ESSA, my model identifies the 
essential components of reform necessary to achieve educational 
equity while leaving substantial flexibility for states and dis-
tricts to tailor these components to their needs. It includes the 
ability to advance equity through a variety of reforms such as 
innovative teacher training programs, on-line learning, and 
school choice, including magnet and charter schools. My model 
also creates a synergy among multiple reforms that is greater 
than each single reform. 
My model recognizes that the implementation of No Child 
Left Behind revealed that states and districts do not always pos-
 
 148. See generally CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP, supra note 1 (discussing 
the scope and causes of educational opportunity gaps). 
 149. See Aldeman, supra note 5, at 91, 94–98.  
 150. For an analysis of ESSA’s flawed approach to remedying opportunity 
gaps requirements, see infra Parts II.B (teacher quality) and II.C (resource in-
equities). 
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sess the knowledge and capacity needed to design and imple-
ment effective reforms.151 For instance, when districts had to im-
plement corrective action or the restructuring of schools under 
No Child Left Behind, which were intended to be the most sys-
temic reforms, these efforts prompted some changes to schools 
“but fell short of what a lay observer might have considered dra-
matic reforms.”152 Many state departments of education also 
lacked the expertise and capacity to guide reform under No Child 
Left Behind.153 States similarly have reported under ESSA that 
they set low criteria to identify schools for improvement because 
they have concerns about their capacity to offer support to a sub-
stantial number of schools.154 Lastly, while ESSA will result in 
a reduction in real per-pupil federal education spending155 and 
federal education spending is expected to decrease in real dollars 
over the next ten years,156 my model calls for an increase in the 
federal investment in education to support comprehensive and 
lasting reform that advances educational equity. This increase 
in federal education funding would expand the capacities of 
states and districts to implement reforms. 
When assessing whether ESSA will enhance or undermine 
equity, it is important to understand that the initial reviews of 
state ESSA plans show that states have not prioritized equity.157 
For instance, the Education Trust’s 2017 review of ESSA plans 
found that “[f]or all of the talk about equity surrounding ESSA, 
 
 151. See PAUL MANNA, COLLISION COURSE: FEDERAL EDUCATION POLICY 
MEETS STATE AND LOCAL REALITIES 49, 83–85 (2011).  
 152. Id. at 83. 
 153. See id. at 49. 
 154. See NATASHA USHOMIRSKY ET AL., THE EDUC. TR., TRENDS IN STATE 
ESSA PLANS: EQUITY ADVOCATES STILL HAVE WORK TO DO 8–9 (2017). 
 155. Aldeman, supra note 5, at 103 (explaining that ESSA’s 7.8% increase 
for Title I over four years will not keep pace with the 8.2% increase that would 
be required for ESSA to keep pace with a modest inflation adjustment). 
 156. JULIA B. ISAACS ET AL., URBAN INST., KIDS’ SHARE 2018: REPORT ON 
FEDERAL EXPENDITURES ON CHILDREN THROUGH 2017 AND FUTURE PROJEC-
TIONS 52 (2018). Although federal education funding has increased from 2016 
to 2017, a study of the trend of this funding finds that it will decline both in real 
dollars and as a percentage of the gross domestic product over the next decade. 
Id. at 14, 52. 
 157. As discussed in greater detail in Part II.B infra, an analysis of state 
plans to implement ESSA’s requirements on the equitable distribution of teach-
ers found that states generally have evaded these requirements. See Elizabeth 
Ross, State ESSA Plans Fail to Adequately Address Educator Inequities, 
REALCLEAREDUCATION (Nov. 14, 2017), https://realcleareducation.com/articles/ 
2017/11/14/state_essa_plans_fail_to_adequately_address_educator_inequities 
.html. 
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too many state leaders have taken a pass on clearly naming and 
acting on schools’ underperformance for low-income students, 
students of color, students with disabilities, and English learn-
ers.”158 In addition, “the vast majority of states” will determine 
school ratings based entirely or mostly on the average school-
wide performance thereby ignoring student subgroup perfor-
mance when rating schools.159 Some states, such as Washington 
and Indiana, are providing ratings for subgroups, but these sub-
group ratings typically do not influence a school’s rating and 
thus are unlikely to spark improvements for, and investments 
in, improving subgroup performance.160 Ultimately, the decision 
by states to base school ratings on averages will allow many 
schools to receive high ratings even though many historically 
disadvantaged students are showing minimal or no improve-
ment.161 
In addition, states must identify a school for targeted sup-
port and improvement if a subgroup is “consistently underper-
forming” as defined entirely by the state.162 States exercised 
their discretion to set low performance expectations for the per-
formance of subgroups.163 For instance, states such as Washing-
ton and New Mexico are only defining underperformance as per-
formance in the bottom 5% of all students.164 This approach 
conflates two distinct categories that were intended for improve-
ment under ESSA—targeted support for “consistently underper-
forming” subgroups and additional targeted support and im-
provement for a subgroup that is performing as poorly as the 
bottom 5% of all students.165 This lackluster commitment to clos-
ing achievement gaps reveals that states are already not living 
up to their recent public commitment to prioritize equity. 
 
 158. USHOMIRSKY ET AL., supra note 154, at 2. 
 159. Id. at 5. 
 160. Id. at 6. 
 161. See id. at 6–7. 
 162. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(d)(2)(A) (2016). 
 163. USHOMIRSKY ET AL., supra note 154, at 8.  
 164. Id.  
 165. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 6311(d)(2)(B) (requiring states to identify a school 
for targeted support and improvement if a subgroup of students consistently 
underperforms as defined by the state), with id. § 6311(d)(2)(C) (requiring addi-
tional targeted support and improvement when a subgroup of students tests in 
the bottom 5% of all students).  
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A. FAIR FUNDING 
1. The Challenge of Inequitable Funding and Why It Matters 
Funding provides the foundation upon which education sys-
tems are built. Three funding sources support schools: state, lo-
cal, and federal funding. The most recent data indicates that 
states provide 46.2% of funding, districts provide 45%, and the 
federal government provides 8.7%.166 The percentage of the state 
contribution varies widely by state, with a high of 89.8% in Ver-
mont and a low of 26% in Illinois.167 Districts primarily raise 
their contribution through property taxes, which contributes to 
funding disparities due to the wealth differences between com-
munities.168 
Research has long confirmed that disadvantaged students 
require more resources for them to be competitive with their 
non-disadvantaged peers.169 A conservative estimate is that dis-
advantaged students need 40% more resources than other stu-
dents, a figure that is based on the Title I funding formula,170 
but some scholars contend that this is an underestimate of the 
additional costs of successfully educating these students.171 For 
instance, one study estimates that it costs at least twice as much 
to educate a disadvantaged child to be as successful as his or her 
peers.172 Additional funding for these students can provide ac-
 
 166. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, DIG. EDUC. STAT. 
Table 235.10 (July 2016), https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d16/tables/dt16_ 
235.10.asp. 
 167. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, DIG. EDUC. STAT. 
Table 235.20 (July 2016), https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d16/tables/dt16_ 
235.20.asp. 
 168. Sean P. Corcoran, The Role of Local Revenues in Funding Disparities 
Across School Districts, in BRUCE D. BAKER & SEAN P. CORCORAN, CTR. FOR AM. 
PROGRESS, THE STEALTH INEQUITIES OF SCHOOL FUNDING: HOW STATE AND LO-
CAL SCHOOL FINANCE SYSTEMS PERPETUATE INEQUITABLE STUDENT SPENDING 
55, 85 (2012); BETTY COX ET AL., THE COSTS OF EDUCATION: REVENUE AND 
SPENDING IN PUBLIC, PRIVATE AND CHARTER SCHOOLS 34 (2013).  
 169. JACK JENNINGS, PRESIDENTS, CONGRESS, AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: 
THE POLITICS OF EDUCATION REFORM 179 (2015); Richard Rothstein, Why Chil-
dren from Lower Socioeconomic Classes, on Average, Have Lower Academic 
Achievement than Middle Class Children, in CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP: 
WHAT AMERICA MUST DO, supra note 32, at 61, 61–69. 
 170. MORGAN & AMERIKANER, supra note 32, at 7. 
 171. E.g. BAKER ET AL., supra note 32, at 4–5.  
 172. See William D. Duncombe & John Yinger, How Much More Does a Dis-
advantaged Student Cost? 17 (Ctr. for Policy Research at Syracuse Univ., Work-
ing Paper No. 60, 2004) (finding that the weights for disadvantaged or limited 
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cess to a high-quality curriculum and supportive curricular re-
sources; more learning time, such as strong after-school and 
summer programs, as well as high-quality early childhood edu-
cation; and, partnerships with outside providers, such as the fos-
ter care system or health care providers.173 
Research also reveals that although the overwhelming ma-
jority of states do provide significant levels of additional state 
funding to students from low-income families, the highest pov-
erty districts typically receive less total state and local fund-
ing.174 Indeed, when federal funding for poor students is removed 
from consideration, studies confirm that poor students often-
times receive either less or the same funding as their more afflu-
ent peers.175 For example, the 2018 study by the Education Trust 
of state and local funding found that nationally the districts with 
the highest poverty receive approximately $1,000, or 7%, less per 
student than the lowest poverty districts.176 For twenty-three 
states, high and low-poverty districts received about the same 
funding, while four states provided less funding to high-poverty 
districts (this pattern is considered regressive).177 Twenty states 
gave at least 5% more funding to low-poverty districts and six of 
those states (Georgia, Minnesota, New Jersey, Ohio, South Da-
kota, and Utah) provide at least 15% more to the districts with 
the most poverty.178 Thus, this study confirms that twenty-seven 
states do not provide high-poverty districts with the additional 
funding they need to meet the needs of students in these dis-
tricts.179 In addition, when this study accounted for the addi-
tional needs of disadvantaged students, it found even greater in-
equities in spending patterns.180 
 
English proficient students should be between 111% and 215%). 
 173. NATASHA USHOMIRSKY & DAVID WILLIAMS, THE EDUC. TR., FUNDING 
GAPS 2015: TOO MANY STATES STILL SPEND LESS ON EDUCATING STUDENTS 
WHO NEED IT MOST 4 (2015); Darling-Hammond, supra note 32, at 77, 88–90; 
Rothstein, supra note 169, at 62, 70. 
 174. MORGAN & AMERIKANER, supra note 32, at 6, 9. 
 175. See BAKER ET AL., supra note 32, at 9; EQUITY & EXCELLENCE COMM’N, 
supra note 38, at 18 (“The majority of states do not provide additional funding 
for students living in high concentrations of poverty.”). 
 176. MORGAN & AMERIKANER, supra note 32, at 6. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 2. 
 180. After this adjustment, high-poverty districts received $2,000 or 16% 
less funding. Twenty rather than four states were regressive and seven rather 
than twenty states provided more funding to high-poverty districts. Id. at 7. 
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A 2018 study by the Education Law Center similarly found 
that a majority of states do not provide high-poverty districts 
with more state and local funding than low-poverty districts, 
with thirty-seven states providing less (seventeen states) or the 
same (twenty states) funding to high-poverty districts.181 State 
funding systems also disadvantage many minority students. The 
districts serving the highest percentages of minority students re-
ceive about $1,800, or 13% less per pupil, than districts with the 
lowest percentages of students of color.182 These disparities led 
the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights to conclude in a 2018 report 
that “vast funding inequities in our state public education sys-
tems render the education available to millions of American pub-
lic school students profoundly unequal.”183 When these dispari-
ties are aggregated among classrooms, schools, and districts, 
they negatively impact the educational opportunities of disad-
vantaged and minority schoolchildren.184 
Funding disparities are important because the longstanding 
debate regarding whether money matters has concluded with a 
consensus that money spent well matters.185 Compelling re-
search supports this conclusion. For example, states that 
adopted reforms that aimed to increase the adequacy of school 
funding between 1990 and 2011 raised student achievement in 
 
 181. The 2018 report Is School Funding Fair? measures the distribution of 
state and local funding relative to poverty. BAKER ET AL., supra note 32, at 9. 
The report finds that seventeen states provide at least 5% or less funding to 
districts with 30% poverty or more, twenty states provide essentially the same 
funding to low- and high-poverty districts and only eleven states provide at least 
5% more funding to districts with 30% or more students in poverty. See id. at 9; 
see also EQUITY & EXCELLENCE COMM’N, supra note 38, at 17. In 2017, scholars 
at the Urban Institute conducted a study of the distribution of total funding and 
found that “poor students in most states attend school districts that are about 
as well funded as the districts nonpoor students attend in their state.” MAT-
THEW M. CHINGOS & KRISTIN BLAGG, THE URBAN INST., DO POOR KIDS GET 
THEIR FAIR SHARE OF SCHOOL FUNDING? 14 (2017). However, when federal dol-
lars that are targeted to poor students are excluded, the study found that even 
though the state funding of education is largely progressive, “about half of the 
states in our study still distribute relatively more local and state funding to 
students not in poverty.” Id. at 7.  
 182. MORGAN & AMERIKANER, supra note 32, at 10. 
 183. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 27, at 9. 
 184. See USHOMIRSKY & WILLIAMS, supra note 173, at 1. 
 185. BAKER ET AL., supra note 32, at 1; Darling-Hammond, supra note 32, at 
97; Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Creating New Path-
ways to Equal Educational Opportunity, in THE ENDURING LEGACY OF RODRI-
GUEZ, supra note 60, at 263, 266.  
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low-income districts and decreased achievement gaps.186 In con-
trast, the achievement gap increased in states without such re-
forms.187 Increased funding has been shown to increase gradua-
tion rates.188 School funding reform also can influence outcomes 
beyond academic performance. For instance, one study found 
that a 10% increase in per-pupil funding for twelve years of 
schooling resulted in a 6% decrease in adult poverty, almost 10% 
more in adult earnings, and almost half a year of additional 
schooling.189 This study suggests that a 25% funding increase 
during a child’s school years could eliminate the disparities in 
outcomes between disadvantaged students and their peers.190 
Other research confirms that states that effectively target addi-
tional resources to higher poverty districts experience improved 
student achievement and smaller achievement gaps.191 Yet, the 
majority of states do not provide sufficient funding for high-pov-
erty children to attain even average levels of achievement.192 
My prior research also identifies several shortcomings of 
school funding systems beyond failing to provide disadvantaged 
students the additional resources that they need.193 For in-
stance, state funding systems often are not systematically de-
signed to provide the funding necessary to enable all students to 
successfully learn the content in state standards.194 In addition, 
many states provide low funding levels that are insufficient to 
provide an adequate education,195 “with the lowest funded states 
 
 186. See Julien LaFortune et al., Can School Finance Reforms Improve Stu-
dent Achievement?, WASH. CTR. FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH (Mar. 16, 2016), 
https://equitablegrowth.org/can-school-finance-reforms-improve-student 
-achievement. 
 187. See id. 
 188. See C. Kirabo Jackson et al., How Money Makes a Difference: The Effects 
of School Finance Reforms on Outcomes for Low Income Students, STAN. CTR. 
FOR OPPORTUNITY POL’Y EDUC. (Nov. 2014), https://edpolicy.stanford.edu/sites/ 
default/files/publications/how-money-makes-difference-effects-school-finance 
-reforms-outcomes-low-income-students.pdf. 
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providing less than a third of what the highest funded states pro-
vide their schools.”196 Unfortunately, most states have failed to 
adopt school funding systems that effectively address the needs 
of the full complement of students, especially those who experi-
ence the greatest disadvantage due to disability, poverty, or lim-
ited English proficiency.197 States also have not developed effec-
tive accountability mechanisms to ensure that the funding 
provided is used efficiently to improve student achievement and 
attain other educational goals.198 These shortcomings compound 
the damage done by the broken foundation of inequitable fund-
ing. 
2. Why ESSA Will Fail to Meet This Challenge 
ESSA generally retains the same Title I funding formulas 
as well as the comparability, supplement-not-supplant, and 
maintenance of effort requirements from No Child Left Behind, 
and scholarly commentary on No Child Left Behind has estab-
lished why these provisions will not result in fair funding. For 
instance, scholars have shown how Title I funds are spread too 
thinly and the formulas do not effectively acknowledge the ad-
verse effects of concentrated poverty, among other concerns.199 
ESSA will mean a decline in actual, per-pupil spending because 
the 7.8% increase for Title I will provide less than the 8.2% in-
crease that would be required to keep funding constant when ad-
justments are considered for a modest increase in inflation and 
student enrollment.200 Similarly, despite the requirement that 
Title I schools be comparable to non-Title I schools, the U.S. 
Commission on Civil Rights noted in a 2018 report that “more 
than 40 percent of Title I schools spent less on personnel per-
pupil than non-Title I schools at the same grade level and that 
are within the same school district.”201 Congress failed to revise 
this provision despite the fact that the provision’s comparability 
requirement is illusory given a regulatory loophole that merely 
requires “substantial comparability,” exempts teacher salaries, 
 
 196. BAKER ET AL., supra note 32, at 28. 
 197. See id. at 1.  
 198. See Robinson, supra note 193, at 216. 
 199. Aldeman, supra note 5, at 102; Black, supra note 3, at 1339; Black, Lev-
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and has left such wide discretion in interpretation that enforce-
ment has been essentially impossible.202 
The DOE attempted to strengthen the supplement-not-sup-
plant provision through its ESSA regulations, but Congress met 
this possibility with great hostility. Former U.S. Secretary of Ed-
ucation John King proposed a regulatory change to the supple-
ment-not-supplant requirement that would have addressed the 
fact that an estimated 5,750 Title I schools received about 
$440,000 less from their states and districts annually than non-
Title I schools.203 The requirement would have required districts 
to establish that they spent roughly the same amount of money, 
including teachers’ salaries, on Title I schools and non-Title I 
schools.204 Congress and interest groups, including the Council 
of Chief State School Officers, expressed strong opposition to this 
proposed regulatory revision.205 The DOE eventually withdrew 
its proposal in early 2017 due to this strenuous opposition.206  
 
 202. Aldeman, supra note 5, at 102; Black, supra note 3, at 1339; Black, Lev-
eraging Funding, supra note 60, at 231, 239; Derek W. Black, The Congressional 
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ucation Act, 90 B.U. L. REV. 313, 315–16 (2010). 
 203. See Fact Sheet: Supplement-not-Supplant Under Title I of the Every Stu-
dent Succeeds Act, U.S. DEP’T EDUC. (Aug. 31, 2016), https://ed.gov/news/press 
-releases/fact-sheet-supplement-not-supplant-under-title-i-every-student 
-succeeds-act. 
 204. See id. 
 205. See Next Steps in K-12 Education: Examining Recent Efforts to Imple-
ment the Every Student Succeeds Act: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Educ. & 
the Workforce, 114th Cong. 2 (2016) (Statement of John Kline, Congressman) 
(“The second troubling sign surrounds the long standing policy that Federal 
funds are a supplement and do not supplant State and local resources . . . . Last 
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the Department is proposing would be both illegal and harmful to students and 
communities.”); ESSA Implementation in States and School Districts Perspec-
tives from the U.S. Secretary of Education: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions, 114th Cong 2 (2016) (statement of Lamar 
Alexander, Sen.) (“Mr. Secretary, not only is what you’re doing against the law, 
but the way you’re trying to do it is against another provision in the law. To 
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Federal title I dollars as a replacement for State and local dollars in low-income 
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supplant” provision that would prohibit you from doing the very things you are 
proposing to do.”); Alyson Klein, Education Department Withdraws Controver-
sial ESSA Spending Proposal, EDUC. WK. (Jan. 18, 2017), http://blogs.edweek 
.org/edweek/campaign-k-12/2017/01/essa_john_b_king_jr_withdraws_.html. 
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Given that ESSA maintains the status quo on provisions 
that directly influence Title I funding, the greatest potential for 
ESSA to improve the fairness of school funding is its require-
ment that districts must publish per-pupil spending data for 
each school and states must report this information for each dis-
trict and school. This and other ESSA provisions are intended to 
offer the public better information and enable it to advance eq-
uity in student access to resources.207 Education scholar Margue-
rite Roza predicts that making these inequities public will create 
a “sunlight effect” that will initially spark outrage and ulti-
mately reform in communities where schools for low-income and 
minority children are provided less funding.208 Others also note 
that this data will put powerful information into the hands of 
local advocates, including those litigating school funding dis-
putes.209  
I agree that this new data in the hands of parents, scholars, 
policymakers, and reformers will spark new conversations about 
funding inequities and what should be done about them. How-
ever, I predict that this requirement will not have as dramatic 
an impact on reducing funding inequities as some hope for sev-
eral reasons. First, ESSA does not require states or districts to 
take any action when funding disparities are revealed. Thus, 
states and districts will still receive millions in federal funding 
without addressing funding inequities. 
Second, many who are outraged about the prevalent dispar-
ities will lack a judicial forum to challenge them. The Supreme 
Court closed the courthouse door to federal claims for a right to 
education that might have remedied inequitable funding dispar-
ities in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez 
when it held that the U.S. Constitution does not recognize an 
explicit or implicit right to education.210 In at least nineteen 
states, plaintiffs have never prevailed in school funding litiga-
tion.211 One of these states is Virginia, where in the 1994 deci-
sion Scott v. Commonwealth, the Virginia Supreme Court held 
that the Commonwealth’s constitutional provisions requiring 
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the legislature to maintain public schools and “to seek to ensure” 
that they provide high-quality education did not require “sub-
stantial equality” in public school spending between or within 
school districts.212 Instead, the Virginia Constitution entrusted 
the quality of the public schools to the sole province of the legis-
lature.213 Other states also have concluded that school funding 
remains within the exclusive and unreviewable purview of the 
legislature.214 In addition, even where plaintiffs have been suc-
cessful in school funding litigation, reforms have been very slow 
to secure and maintain, as many state legislatures frequently 
resisted enacting the necessary reforms, particularly when pre-
dominantly minority districts prevailed in court.215 Even those 
who have brought successful school funding litigation support 
the development of a federal forum for funding litigation because 
state courts do not provide adequate protection for disadvan-
taged students.216 
Third, poor and minority communities possess limited polit-
ical power and influence to secure equitable reform through 
state legislatures and local school boards.217 Most state legisla-
tures are not interested in increasing educational equity.218 
State legislatures have long had access to the data that shows 
enduring inequities, yet education scholar and reformer Cynthia 
Brown has noted that “despite this ready access to information 
that can and does reveal inequities, state efforts to correct even 
glaring problems are rare.”219 Similarly, many local govern-
ments will not provide effective avenues for reform. Local partic-
ipation in school governance is quite low with no more than 10–
 
 212. See Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138, 142 (Va. 1994). 
 213. See id. 
 214. See, e.g., Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1186 (Ill. 
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form, in THE ENDURING LEGACY OF RODRIGUEZ, supra note 60, at 119, 125–33. 
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15% of voters participating in school board elections.220 Many lo-
cal school boards limit the discussion of citizens at public meet-
ings and the discussions often do not influence districts’ deci-
sions.221 The limited political influence of many disadvantaged 
and minority communities suggests that they may lack the lev-
erage to demand change. 
Finally, the impacts of funding disparities have been plain 
for all to see for generations, including in New York Times best-
selling books by such authors as Jonathan Kozol beginning in 
the 1990s and Robert Putnam in 2015.222 These disparities are 
also in plain view in just a short drive from many cities to their 
surrounding suburbs.223 The pervasiveness and consistency of 
these disparities reveals that the nation has decided to tolerate 
and even embrace these disparities. Therefore, while ESSA’s re-
quirements to publish per-pupil funding data could spark some 
reform, it is more likely that only limited reform will occur when 
citizens, advocacy groups, and state and local governments pro-
vide the catalyst for reform. History suggests that federal incen-
tives and conditions that support funding reform will be neces-
sary for states and localities to initiate and sustain 
comprehensive funding reform that provides fair funding. 
B. AN EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF EFFECTIVE TEACHERS 
Scholars concur that access to high-quality teachers is the 
most important resource for student success, particularly for the 
success of disadvantaged students.224 Achieving this goal re-
quires, among other reforms, recruiting and retaining high-qual-
ity teachers for disadvantaged and minority students, offering 
impactful professional development and feedback as well as in-
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creasing the selectivity of teacher hiring and retention deci-
sions.225 The research described below establishes that disad-
vantaged and minority students are consistently provided lower 
quality teachers and that the inequitable distribution of teachers 
has an adverse effect on their success. I also analyze why ESSA 
will not provide adequate support for ensuring the equitable dis-
tribution of effective teachers. 
1. The Challenge of the Inequitable Distribution of Effective 
Teachers and Why It Matters 
Research confirms that low-income and minority students 
are educated by significantly less experienced and less qualified 
teachers, which harms their academic outcomes.226 These ineq-
uities occur just as often within schools as between schools.227 
Indeed, leading education expert Linda Darling-Hammond has 
noted that “[b]y every measure of qualifications—certification, 
subject matter background, pedagogical training, selectivity of 
college attended, test scores, or experience—less qualified teach-
ers are found in schools serving greater numbers of low-income 
 
 225. See CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP, supra note 1, at 38–39. 
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and minority students.”228 The fact that disadvantaged and mi-
nority students typically receive less effective teachers across 
multiple measures229 confirms the deeply entrenched nature of 
this problem throughout the United States. 
Studies of students, schools, districts, and states confirm 
that the background, preparation, certification, and experience 
of teachers exerts a substantial influence on student achieve-
ment.230 As the proportion of teachers who are uncertified, inex-
perienced, and underprepared increases, student achievement 
decreases.231 Teacher knowledge impacts student outcomes, par-
ticularly in mathematics, yet disadvantaged students are less 
likely than children from high-income families to be taught by 
teachers with high knowledge levels.232 High-poverty schools are 
less likely than low-poverty schools to have a math or science 
teacher who is teaching in her or his field.233 High-poverty 
schools also have significantly fewer teachers with a master’s de-
gree than those in low-poverty schools.234 Some research indi-
cates that teachers who have taught for at least two years or 
more are more effective than teachers with one year or less of 
teaching experience.235 Children from disadvantaged households 
have less access to teachers with at least two years of experi-
ence.236 In addition, novice science and math teachers are more 
common in high-poverty schools than low-poverty schools, and 
are more common in high-minority schools than low-minority 
schools.237 
Research also shows that instructional quality strongly in-
fluences the amount students learn and confirms the impact of 
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such instructional factors as adequate instructional time, a ro-
bust curriculum, and aligning instruction to the abilities of stu-
dents. Children of different races with similar abilities perform 
similarly when they receive the same quality of instruction.238 
Schools with high concentrations of low-income and minority 
students experience more teacher turnover than other schools239 
and “the constant staff churn consigns a large share of children 
in high-need schools to a parade of relatively ineffective teach-
ers, leading to higher rates of remediation, grade retention, and 
dropping out.”240 When states invest resources in initiatives like 
smaller classes in high-poverty districts and competitive sala-
ries, these states experience higher academic achievement for 
disadvantaged children and a smaller achievement gap between 
disadvantaged students and their more affluent peers.241 In ad-
dition, some research has found that teacher qualifications can 
exert more influence on achievement than the race of a child or 
their parents’ education.242 
Given the influential nature of teachers on student learning, 
the equitable distribution of effective teachers works in synergy 
with the other building blocks of my model. For instance, equi-
tably distributing effective teachers is dependent on fair funding 
that appropriately recognizes the additional challenges teachers 
face in struggling communities. Teachers also will be reluctant 
to teach and remain in resource-starved working environments. 
Families will not choose to send their children to schools with 
low-quality teachers, and thus, integration is dependent on 
teachers being equitably distributed. 
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2. Why ESSA Will Fail to Meet This Challenge 
Despite its requirement that states must ensure that low-
income and minority students are not disproportionately taught 
by inexperienced, out-of-field, or ineffective teachers,243 ESSA 
will not have a significant impact on the equitable distribution 
of effective teachers for several reasons. Research and data con-
firm that the quality and qualifications of teachers remain ineq-
uitably distributed in spite of the No Child Left Behind require-
ment that states ensure that inexperienced, out-of-field, or 
ineffective teachers do not disproportionately teach disadvan-
taged and minority students and that state plans identify how 
states will evaluate and report to the public progress on achiev-
ing this goal.244 A DOE study of teacher quality found that alt-
hough the overwhelming majority of teachers were highly quali-
fied by 2006–07, teachers who were not highly qualified were 
more likely to teach in a high-poverty school than a low-poverty 
school (5% of teachers not highly qualified versus 1% respec-
tively), and more likely to teach in a school with more than 75% 
minority students than a school with less than 25% minority stu-
dents (4% of teachers not highly qualified versus 1% respec-
tively).245 Even among highly qualified teachers, high-poverty 
schools were significantly more likely to employ teachers with 
less than three years of experience (14% of teachers with less 
than three years of experience versus 8% respectively), and such 
teachers were more than twice as likely to teach in a school with 
more than 75% minority students than a school with less than 
25% minority students (15% of teachers with less than three 
years of experience versus 7% respectively).246 Highly qualified 
secondary teachers of English and math were less likely to pos-
sess a degree in the field if they taught in high-poverty schools 
than in low-poverty schools (40% versus 59%), while the percent-
ages of such teachers in high- and low-minority schools was com-
parable.247 ESSA retains and does not make improvements to 
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the No Child Left Behind requirements on the distribution of 
teachers that have allowed these disparities to persist. 
When the DOE possessed real power to hold states account-
able for compliance under No Child Left Behind, it paid minimal 
attention to the requirement that disadvantaged and minority 
students should not be disproportionately taught by unqualified 
teachers.248 Early implementation efforts did not require states 
to address this requirement and instead emphasized accounta-
bility and assessment requirements.249 Despite the fact that it 
contradicted No Child Left Behind, DOE did not require states 
to report the percentage of highly qualified teachers in schools 
with low concentrations of poverty. This allowed states to mask 
differences in teacher quality between high- and low- poverty 
schools because these differences are typically larger than the 
difference between the state averages and high-poverty 
schools.250 
In addition, the ESSA requirement that poor and minority 
students must not disproportionately be taught by inexperi-
enced, ineffective, and out-of-field teachers lacks an accountabil-
ity provision to ensure enforcement.251 Given the fact that DOE 
did not enforce this provision under No Child Left Behind and 
the many limits on the Secretary of Education’s authority to en-
force ESSA, the hands-off approach of ESSA is unlikely to spark 
significant state reform. In addition, ESSA notes that states are 
not required “to develop or implement a teacher, principal, or 
other school leader evaluation system.”252 This caveat suggests 
that states should rely on existing teacher evaluation systems to 
define an “ineffective” and “inexperienced” teacher despite the 
fact that these systems may not have been designed to assist in 
fostering the equitable distribution of effective and experienced 
teachers. States determine how an ineffective and inexperienced 
teacher is defined,253 and thus, they have the flexibility to set a 
low bar for teacher effectiveness, just as they set low standards 
for a highly qualified teacher under No Child Left Behind.254 
Furthermore, the requirement to report the qualifications of 
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teachers based on school poverty will only lead to impactful re-
forms to the extent that local constituents have the ability to 
hold districts accountable for redistributing teachers. Thus, like 
the requirement to publish per-pupil spending, the impact of this 
provision will be circumscribed by the limited influence of socio-
economically disadvantaged and minority local constituents. 
ESSA also requires that teachers be state certified.255 Since 
all states already have a certification system, this minimal re-
quirement allows states to decide not to improve teacher quality 
at all. This approach retains some of the same flaws of No Child 
Left Behind’s highly qualified teacher requirement because it 
similarly establishes a low standard to qualify as a teacher. No 
Child Left Behind required teachers to possess a bachelor’s de-
gree, state certification and subject matter knowledge.256 The 
highly qualified teacher requirement did have some positive im-
pacts. More content-focused professional development was pro-
vided to teachers in elementary schools with high concentrations 
of disadvantaged and minority students.257 Principals reported 
an increase in firing or transferring teachers who were not 
highly qualified during No Child Left Behind implementation, 
with principals at high-poverty schools, high-minority schools, 
and schools selected for improvement reporting a greater likeli-
hood of teacher firing or transfer.258 Research also confirms that 
the percentage of teachers who were highly qualified increased 
in the years following No Child Left Behind.259 
However, No Child Left Behind’s highly qualified teacher 
requirements did not significantly raise the bar for teacher qual-
ity beyond the same basic teacher qualification standards that 
had been around for decades.260 Many state and district officials 
have confirmed that the No Child Left Behind highly qualified 
requirements had little to no impact on teacher effectiveness.261 
 
 255. See 20 U.S.C. § 6311(h)(1)(C)(ix)(III) (2016); Black, supra note 3, at 
1336. 
 256. 20 U.S.C. §§ 6319(a)(1), 7801(23)(A–C) (2012) (repealed 2015). 
 257. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 245, at xxx. 
 258. See id. at xxvii–xxviii. 
 259. A review of data by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) found 
that 84.5% of teachers possessed a bachelor’s degree and state certification be-
fore No Child Left Behind was passed and that a steady increase in the number 
of highly qualified teachers was found with 96.7% of teachers meeting the re-
quirement by 2009–10. See JEFFREY J. KUENZI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
TEACHER QUALITY ISSUES IN THE ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION 
ACT 10–11 (2012). 
 260. Rebell, supra note 216, at 69. 
 261. See JENNIFER MCMURRER, CTR. ON EDUC. POLICY, IMPLEMENTING THE 
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Defining high quality with such a low bar does not address the 
many ways that students in high-poverty and high-minority 
schools are disadvantaged by disparities in teachers’ experience, 
test scores, subject matter knowledge, out-of-field teaching and 
pedagogical training.262 In fact, DOE itself acknowledged in a 
2009 report on teacher quality under No Child Left Behind that 
“the designation of being highly qualified is not a guarantee that 
students will be taught by teachers with similar skills and 
knowledge, and the differences among teachers continued to dis-
advantage the students who were most in need.”263 Instead, in-
equities endured in the distribution of teacher qualifications, 
such as experience and course preparation, even when teachers 
satisfied the highly qualified teacher requirements.264 
Furthermore, DOE did not enforce the highly qualified 
teacher provision, even when the Secretary had real authority to 
enforce the law against recalcitrant states, just as it did not en-
force the requirement to not disproportionately burden disad-
vantaged and minority students with less qualified teachers.265 
Secretary of Education Margaret Spellings acknowledged in a 
July 2007 letter that the 2005–06 highly qualified teacher dead-
line passed without a single state meeting it.266 She also pro-
vided greater flexibility beyond 2007 for state compliance.267 Ul-
timately, “the existence of plans, improved data collection, and 
detectable progress toward meeting the highly qualified teacher 
goal, rather than accomplishing the goal itself, became the de-
partment’s expectation.”268 Therefore, there is no reason to think 
 
NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND TEACHER REQUIREMENTS 1 (2007) (“More than one-
third (38%) of responding states and almost three-quarters (74%) of districts 
reported that these requirements have had minimal or no impact on the effec-
tiveness of the teacher workforce. Only 8% of states and 6% of districts said that 
these requirements have improved teacher effectiveness to a great extent.”). 
 262. See NAT’L SCI. FOUND., supra note 233, at 1-22–1-22; Darling-Ham-
mond, supra note 32, at 87.  
 263. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 245, at 59. 
 264. See id. at 53, 140; see also MANNA, supra note 151, at 102–05; Michael 
A. Rebell & Molly A. Hunter, “Highly Qualified” Teachers: Pretense or Legal 
Requirement?, 85 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 690, 691 (2004). The CRS data showed a 
smaller gap on the percentage of highly qualified teachers in high- and low-
poverty schools. See KUENZI, supra note 259, at 10. 
 265. See MANNA, supra note 151, at 58. 
 266. See id. 
 267. See id. 
 268. See id. 
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that ESSA’s limited provisions to improve the quality and distri-
bution of teachers will bring about meaningful change in teacher 
quality. 
An early analysis of the implementation of ESSA’s require-
ments on teacher quality indicates that states are not planning 
to implement these requirements in ways that will drive equity. 
The National Council on Teacher Quality’s review of the ESSA 
plans for fifty states and the District of Columbia found that 
states have mostly evaded their obligation to adopt strong ac-
countability plans for ensuring that students of color and low-
income students receive equitable opportunities to be educated 
by strong teachers.269 Thirty-five states do not publicly report 
data that assesses whether low-income and minority students 
are disproportionately taught by ineffective, out-of-field, or inex-
perienced teachers.270 To eliminate teacher equity gaps, states 
need to provide clear and purposeful timelines and goals for end-
ing equity gaps. However, only seven states provide this infor-
mation.271 This review indicates that additional federal efforts 
are needed beyond ESSA for states to make firm commitments 
to teacher equity. 
C. HIGH QUALITY PREK-12 OPPORTUNITIES TO LEARN 
The opportunity to learn encompasses a broad array of edu-
cational experiences, including exposure to a rigorous curricu-
lum, the instructional materials needed to deliver the curricu-
lum, facilities that support student engagement, and strong 
extracurricular offerings.272 The opportunity to learn also in-
cludes the supports students need to reach their full potential, 
such as effective guidance counselors and tutors.273 To under-
stand why providing high-quality preK-12 opportunities to learn 
is critical for closing the opportunity gap, it is essential to recog-
nize that standards measuring the opportunity to learn were a 
key component of the standards and accountability move-
ment.274 Opportunity to learn standards were introduced with 
content standards to ensure that students receive equal access 
 
 269. Ross, supra note 157. 
 270. ELIZABETH ROSS ET AL., NAT’L COUNCIL ON TEACHER QUALITY, 2017 
STATE TEACHER POLICY YEARBOOK: NATIONAL SUMMARY 4 (2017). 
 271. See Ross, supra note 157. 
 272. See CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP, supra note 1, at 39–42. 
 273. See id.  
 274. See Barone & DeBray, supra note 6, at 73–74. For further analysis of 
how opportunity to learn standards could be developed and prove politically fea-
sible, see Robinson, supra note 50, at 988–97. 
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to the resources that they need to successfully learn the content 
of challenging academic standards.275 However, the avenues for 
states to adopt opportunity to learn standards included in Goals 
2000276 and the Improving America’s Schools Act of 1994277 were 
repealed once a Republican majority took control of Congress.278 
Under both Goals 2000 and the Improving America’s 
Schools Act, state opportunity to learn standards were voluntary 
and “states had little appetite to tackle inequitable resource is-
sues.”279 State resistance to addressing inequities in the oppor-
tunity to learn remains as strong now as it was then.280 Even 
with the growing abundance of data that reveals inequities in 
the distribution of school resources, states rarely address these 
inequities in a comprehensive fashion.281 Yet, oftentimes what 
you measure is what matters,282 so the rationale behind measur-
ing opportunity to learn remains sound. 
Today, many minority and disadvantaged students receive 
opportunities to learn that are significantly inferior in quality to 
the opportunities that are provided to their peers.283 This occurs 
in substantial part due to the widespread nature of inequitable 
funding practices discussed in Part II.A. This Section highlights 
some of the important opportunity gaps. It then analyzes why 
ESSA is not structured to ensure equitable access to high-quality 
opportunities to learn. 
 
 275. See DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 224, at 73–74. 
 276. See Goals 2000: Educate America Act § 212, 213(c)–(d) (1994). Goals 
2000 allowed states to develop their own opportunity to learn standards and it 
created the National Education Standards and Improvement Council to write 
voluntary opportunity to learn standards for states. Id. 
 277. See Improving America’s Schools Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, 
§ 1111(b)(8), 108 Stat. 3518, 3523 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
20 U.S.C.). The Improving America’s Schools Act required states to explain how 
they would assist schools and districts in developing the capacity to enable stu-
dents to achieve high standards, which could include opportunity to learn stand-
ards. Id. 
 278. See Robinson, supra note 50, at 992–93 (summarizing the federal legis-
lation that included opportunity to learn standards). 
 279. See Brown, supra note 23, at 159. 
 280. See id. 
 281. See id. at 165. 
 282. See Welner & Carter, supra note 33, at 2–4 (explaining that the empha-
sis on measuring and remedying achievement gaps has overlooked the need to 
close educational opportunity gaps). 
 283. See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 27, at 5, 9. 
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1. The Challenge of Disparities in PreK-12 Opportunities to 
Learn and Why It Matters 
The opportunity gap begins very early in the lives of chil-
dren in the United States.284 For instance, a collaborative study 
of the opportunity gap by leading scholars led by Robert D. Put-
nam noted such profound differences as: 
Rich kids enter kindergarten over a full year ahead of bottom-third 
kids, having had almost 1400 more hours of developmental time with 
their parents (think Good Night Moon or paddy cake time), having ex-
perienced more personalized daycare or the presence of stay-at-home 
moms, having received $5,700 more of annual parental expenditures 
on categories like musical instruments or books or summer camp or 
trips to Paris, and having heard 30 million more words than their 
poorer counterparts.285 
Most developed countries invest more in children under five 
than the United States.286 Despite compelling evidence of the 
benefits of high-quality early childhood education, in the great 
majority of states within the United States, disadvantaged and 
minority children are significantly less likely to attend early 
childhood education programs than their peers.287 
Disparities in educational opportunity among children from 
different socioeconomic backgrounds and racial groups continue 
throughout their elementary and secondary education. Public 
schools are exacerbating the challenges that disadvantaged and 
minority students bring to classrooms by giving them less of the 
essential tools that are needed to succeed.288 For instance, 
schools serving higher concentrations of poor and minority stu-
dents (except Asian students) have less access to advanced and 
gifted course offerings and college preparatory curricula than 
schools serving mostly white and middle class students.289 Stu-
dents in poor schools often lack access to foreign language 
 
 284. See CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP, supra note 1, at 24. 
 285. See id. at 4. 
 286. See id. at 24–25. 
 287. See BAKER ET AL., supra note 32, at 23; U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., A MATTER 
OF EQUITY: PRESCHOOL IN AMERICA 5 (2015), https://www2.ed.gov/documents/ 
early-learning/matter-equity-preschool-america.pdf. For benefits of high-qual-
ity care, see Meredith J. Harbach, Childcare Market Failure, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 
659, 679–84 (2015); Meredith J. Harbach, Nudging Parents, 19 J. GENDER RACE 
& JUST. 73, 78–81 (2016). 
 288. EQUITY & EXCELLENCE COMM’N, supra note 38, at 14. 
 289. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., HIGHER EDUCATION: 
GAPS IN ACCESS AND PERSISTENCE STUDY 45 (2012), https://nces.ed.gov/ 
pubs2012/2012046.pdf; CHRISTINA THEOKAS & REID SAARIS, FINDING AMER-
ICA’S MISSING AP AND IB STUDENTS 3–4 (2013), https://edtrust.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2013/10/Missing_Students.pdf (“Low-income students (15 percent) 
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courses in high school, while wealthier schools oftentimes offer 
these courses in elementary school.290 A study of opportunities 
to learn across all fifty states found that approximately one-third 
or more of low-income and most minority students attend low-
performing, poorly-resourced schools while 15% of white stu-
dents and 21% of Asian American students attend such 
schools.291 This rate of attendance at substandard schools is too 
high for all subgroups, but particularly egregious for poor and 
most minority communities. 
Many low-income and minority students are educated in 
schools with instructional materials, technology, and essential 
facilities that are of lower quality than those of their peers.292 
More minority and low-income children attend school in build-
ings of substandard physical quality than their white and more 
affluent peers.293 Research also confirms that students in sub-
standard facilities perform below their peers who attend school 
in more functional and newer buildings.294 Children from low-
income backgrounds also participate in fewer extracurricular ac-
tivities.295 Small disadvantages in educational opportunity that 
are repeated on an annual basis can compound and become in-
fluential gaps by the time children complete school.296 
Disparities in learning opportunities that occur throughout 
childhood influence lifelong outcomes. Cognitive, social, and 
emotional skill deficits of young children are harbingers of adult 
gaps in educational achievement and success in the labor mar-
ket.297 Early disadvantages also make it more difficult to close 
achievement gaps as the child matures.298 Therefore, childhood, 
 
were almost twice as likely as other students (8 percent) to attend a school with-
out the full complement of [Advanced Placement] courses. Similarly, American-
Indian (18 percent) and black (15 percent) students were far more likely than 
white (9 percent) students to have more limited course options.”). 
 290. See Darling-Hammond, supra note 32, at 90. 
 291. SCHOTT FOUND. FOR PUB. EDUC., LOST OPPORTUNITY: A 50 STATE RE-
PORT ON THE OPPORTUNITY TO LEARN IN AMERICA: NATIONAL SUMMARY RE-
PORT 8 (2009). 
 292. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 27, at 4–5. 
 293. COUNCIL OF THE GREAT CITY SCH., REVERSING THE CYCLE OF DETERI-
ORATION IN THE NATION’S PUBLIC SCHOOL BUILDINGS 5 (2014). 
 294. See id.; Sapna Cheryan et al., Designing Classrooms to Maximize Stu-
dent Achievement, 1 POL’Y INSIGHTS FROM BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 4, 6 (2014). 
 295. See PUTNAM, supra note 222, at 176. 
 296. See CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP, supra note 1, at 37. 
 297. See id. at 26. 
 298. See id. at 25. 
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particularly early childhood, is an essential time to prevent edu-
cational inequalities.299 
The good news is that early investments in children matter 
a great deal because the brain development of children as well 
as an array of skills, such as language, social-emotional, cogni-
tive, and behavioral skills, are quite responsive in young chil-
dren.300 New research is finding that investments at the earliest 
ages—infants and toddlers—can help to prevent disparities in 
achievement outcomes.301 Research confirms that early child-
hood is the most promising time to invest in children, with some 
studies finding that early investments sometimes not only re-
sulted in substantial impacts but also “paid for themselves sev-
eral times over.”302 High-quality early childhood education can 
help disadvantaged and minority children enter school more 
ready to acquire the knowledge and skills provided in their 
schools.303 High-quality early education also can improve high 
 
 299. See id. at 26. 
 300. See id. at 24.  
 301. See id. at 30. 
 302. Id. at 28; see also COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., THE ECONOMIC PROMISE OF 
INVESTING IN HIGH-QUALITY PRESCHOOL: USING EARLY EDUCATION TO IM-
PROVE ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY OF STATES AND 
THE NATION 25 (2006) (noting research that finds that every dollar invested in 
preschool programs for disadvantaged students yields between $2 and $16 in 
benefits); James J. Heckman, Schools, Skills, and Synapses, 46 ECON. INQUIRY 
289, 314 (2008) (noting that social policy should be directed to investment in a 
child’s early years and that late interventions are not as effective or efficient). 
 303. See FARAH Z. AHMAD & KATIE HAMM, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE 
SCHOOL-READINESS GAP AND PRESCHOOL BENEFITS FOR CHILDREN OF COLOR 1 
(2013) (noting the school readiness benefits of high-quality preschool for chil-
dren of color); CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP, supra note 1, at 28 (noting the 
benefits of high-quality early childhood education, particularly for disadvan-
taged students); DIONNE DOBBINS ET AL., ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., UN-
EQUAL ACCESS: BARRIERS TO EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION FOR BOYS OF 
COLOR 6 (2016) (noting that high-quality early education reaps educational and 
societal benefits for low-income children of color); U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HU-
MAN SERV., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, HEAD START IMPACT STUDY FI-
NAL REPORT xxxvi (2010) (finding that African American children who partici-
pated in Head Start beginning at age four reported improved relationships with 
teachers, less inattentiveness, and fewer difficulties with peer interactions and 
structured learning by the end of kindergarten); Heckman, supra note 302, at 
310 fig.17 (finding higher graduation rates, fewer arrests, higher earnings and 
less participation in welfare for adults who participated in the Perry Preschool 
Program). 
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school graduation rates, lower incarceration rates, improve out-
comes in the labor market, and enhance health even when test 
score gains dissipate over time.304  
Research also establishes that high-quality opportunities to 
learn in elementary and secondary school can improve student 
outcomes and help to reduce achievement gaps between disad-
vantaged students and their peers as well as between minority 
students and their peers. For instance, studies find that the 
achievement of both minority and economically disadvantaged 
students improves in small classes even though these children 
are more likely to be in large classes.305 In addition, research 
confirms that disadvantaged and minority students benefit aca-
demically from such inputs as expanded learning opportunities, 
including after-school and summer programs, and adequate 
structural facilities that provide sufficient lighting, air quality, 
and heating.306 A study of achievement of minority children in 
high-quality charter schools found that “providing high-quality 
schools to children who live in low-quality environments can sig-
nificantly increase their achievement.”307 In contrast, the study 
found that improving the social environment in which the chil-
dren were raised did not result in a significant increase in 
achievement, and thus, it concluded that “it may not take a vil-
lage to increase the achievement of the poorest minority stu-
dents, just a high-quality school.”308 
Disadvantaged and minority students benefit from access to 
a robust and engaging curriculum that includes an early empha-
sis on math and literacy, incorporates higher order thinking, and 
 
 304. See CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP, supra note 1, at 28; Heckman, su-
pra note 302 (presenting evidence of long-term gains). 
 305. See WILLIAM J. MATHIS, RESEARCH-BASED OPTIONS FOR EDUCATION 
POLICYMAKING: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CLASS SIZE REDUCTION 1; see also Ken-
neth Leithwood & Doris Jantzi, A Review of Empirical Evidence About School 
Size Effects: A Policy Perspective, 79 REV. EDUC. RES. 464, 470, 484 (2009) 
(showing that socially and economically disadvantaged students benefit from 
small schools). 
 306. See HOWARD T. EVERSON & ROGER E. MILLSAP, COLL. BD., EVERYONE 
GAINS: EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES IN HIGH SCHOOL AND HIGHER SAT 
SCORES 1 (2005); MARGO GARDNER ET AL., CAMPAIGN FOR EDUC. EQUITY, EQ-
UITY MATTERS: RES. REV. NO. 4: CAN AFTER-SCHOOL PROGRAMS HELP LEVEL 
THE ACADEMIC PLAYING FIELD FOR DISADVANTAGED YOUTH? 5 (2009); Cheryan 
et al., supra note 294, at 9; Michael A. Rebell & Jessica R. Wolff, Educational 
Opportunity Is Achievable and Affordable, 93 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 62–63 (2012). 
 307. Vilsa E. Curto et al., It May Not Take a Village: Increasing Achievement 
Among the Poor, in WHITHER OPPORTUNITY?, supra note 35, at 483, 486. 
 308. Id. at 486. 
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embraces subjects like art, music, science and social studies.309 
Extracurricular activities are essential because, even after con-
trolling for the socioeconomic background of the child’s family, 
these activities are associated with beneficial outcomes, such as 
a “higher grade-point averages, lower dropout rates, lower tru-
ancy, better work habits, higher educational aspirations, lower 
delinquency rates, greater self-esteem, more psychological resil-
ience, less risky behavior, more civic engagement (like voting 
and volunteering), and higher future wages and occupational at-
tainment.”310 High-quality learning opportunities benefit all stu-
dents, but they are particularly important for disadvantaged 
students because they help to mitigate the adverse effects of pov-
erty. 
2. Why ESSA Will Fail to Meet This Challenge 
ESSA will not provide sufficient incentives for most states 
to close opportunity gaps for several reasons. ESSA requires dis-
tricts with schools in the bottom 5% of the state to “identif[y] 
resource inequities” that are “to be addressed through imple-
mentation of [the] comprehensive support and improvement 
plan.”311 This provision is unlikely to guide districts to reduce 
opportunity gaps. ESSA does not specify which resource inequi-
ties should or must be studied, thereby allowing districts to come 
up with a relatively short list of resources to reduce their com-
pliance burden. Although the provision notes that districts may 
consider school level budgeting,312 even this basic metric is not 
required in the identification of resource inequities. This provi-
sion will also overlook the larger inequalities between districts 
within a state.313 
 
 309. See CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP, supra note 1, at 39; Darling-Ham-
mond, supra note 32, at 89–91.  
 310. PUTNAM, supra note 222, at 174–75 (citations omitted); see also DEBO-
RAH LOWE VANDELL ET AL., OUTCOMES LINKED TO HIGH-QUALITY AFTER-
SCHOOL PROGRAMS: LONGITUDINAL FINDINGS FROM THE STUDY OF PROMISING 
AFTERSCHOOL PROGRAMS (2007), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED499113.pdf 
(“A new study by researchers at the University of California, Irvine, the Uni-
versity of Wisconsin-Madison and Policy Studies Associates, Inc. finds that reg-
ular participation in high-quality afterschool programs is linked to significant 
gains in standardized test scores and work habits as well as reductions in be-
havior problems among disadvantaged students.”). 
 311. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(d)(1)(B)(iv) (2016). 
 312. Id.  
 313. Black, supra note 3, at 1352–53 (noting that districts may even expand 
funding inequalities and deficits). 
  
2018] RESTRUCTURING EDUCATION EQUITY 965 
 
In addition, the provision is ambiguous about what “ad-
dress” means. Anything from tinkering at the margins of inequi-
ties to eradicating them could fall within the definition of “ad-
dress” because the provision does not specify that inequities 
must be addressed in a meaningful and comprehensive manner. 
Given that districts can claim compliance with minimal inter-
ventions, this provision is unlikely to yield significant reductions 
in longstanding opportunity gaps. Most importantly, this provi-
sion will prove ineffective because the district that created and 
tolerated the inequities is charged with addressing them. This 
approach resembles the nation’s approach to school desegrega-
tion that left the remedy to those who created the harmful prac-
tice.314 That approach proved unsuccessful then315 and it is un-
likely to work now. 
ESSA also continues the central flaw in the standards and 
accountability movement: it does not hold states, districts, and 
schools accountable for providing unequal access to the high-
quality learning opportunities that would help to reduce achieve-
ment gaps.316 The educational opportunity gap between disad-
vantaged students and their more affluent peers fuels most of 
the achievement gap.317 Yet, it is the achievement gap that re-
ceives the lion’s share of attention from ESSA with the limited 
ineffectual exception noted above and the requirement regarding 
the equitable distribution of teachers critiqued in Part II.B.2. 
Furthermore, ESSA’s continued heavy emphasis on using 
testing results to identify low-performing schools may help to 
perpetuate inferior learning opportunities for students in disad-
vantaged and minority schools. Being identified as a school in 
the bottom 5% of schools in a district or state is likely to have the 
same impact that the label “in need of improvement” had on 
 
 314. See Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Resurrecting the Promise of Brown: 
Understanding and Remedying How the Supreme Court Reconstitutionalized 
Segregated Schools, 88 N.C. L. REV. 787, 798 (2010) (noting that Brown II 
“placed those most invested in forestalling desegregation in charge of implemen-
tation”). 
 315. See id. at 800–04 (noting that southern districts adopted measures that 
resulted in little to no desegregation). 
 316. See Black, supra note 3, at 1351–53; Welner & Carter, supra note 33, 
at 4 (noting that the increase in high standards “never took the next crucial 
step: holding policy makers accountable for ensuring the conditions and re-
sources necessary to create and maintain a system of excellence that offers uni-
versal opportunity”).  
 317. Kevin G. Welner & Prudence L. Carter, Building Opportunities to 
Achieve, in CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP: WHAT AMERICA MUST DO, supra 
note 32, at 217–19.  
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schools under No Child Left Behind. Such schools were labeled 
as failures and this label sometimes caused an array of negative 
interventions, such as teaching to the test and repetitive practice 
tests that rely on memorization rather than a deep understand-
ing of course material.318 Given that many high-poverty and 
high-minority schools will be the schools that are identified, this 
approach can deprive these students of a much-needed rich cur-
riculum that embraces higher order thinking and a range of ac-
ademic subjects beyond math and reading, including art and mu-
sic.319 In addition, the continued heavy emphasis on test results 
can cause schools to devalue the importance of other activities 
that improve outcomes for children, such as extracurricular ac-
tivities that can increase graduation rates and help students 
learn teamwork, interpersonal communication, and grit.320 
ESSA’s ineffectual approaches to funding and the equitable dis-
tribution of teachers also will permit states and districts to main-
tain the funding and teacher distribution practices that exacer-
bate opportunity gaps. For these reasons, ESSA will not 
effectively guide states in closing longstanding opportunity gaps. 
D. ECONOMIC AND RACIAL INTEGRATION 
Substantial racial and economic isolation of students are 
well-documented causes of the opportunity gap.321 Both concen-
trated poverty and racial isolation are growing within the public 
schools in the United States.322 The challenges of economic seg-
regation are often compounded by racial segregation.323 This 
Section summarizes the research on the challenges that increas-
ing socioeconomic and racial segregation cause and their impact 
on student achievement. This Section then shows how ESSA 
missed a critical opportunity to encourage states and districts to 
promote integration.  
 
 318. See Linda Darling-Hammond, Evaluating No Child Left Behind: The 
Problems and Promises of Bush’s Education Policy, NATION (May 2, 2007), 
https://thenation.com/article/evaluating-no-child-left-behind/; Peter Schrag, 
High Stakes Are for Tomatoes, ATLANTIC (Aug. 2000), http://theatlantic.com/ 
magazine/archive/2000/08/high-stakes-are-for-tomatoes/378306.  
 319. See CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP, supra note 1, at 39. 
 320. See id. at 40. 
 321. See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 27, at 5; CLOSING THE 
OPPORTUNITY GAP, supra note 1, at 38 (“American segregation is a problem be-
cause it leads to and reinforces inequalities in school quality and resources.”). 
 322. EQUITY & EXCELLENCE COMM’N, supra note 38, at 18; GARY ORFIELD 
ET AL., UCLA CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, BROWN AT 62: SCHOOL SEGREGATION BY 
RACE, POVERTY AND STATE 1 (2016).  
 323. See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 27, at 13.  
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1. The Challenge of Economic and Racial Segregation and 
Why It Matters 
Socioeconomic and racial segregation in schools are on the 
rise in the United States. The percentage of public schools that 
are both poor and predominantly African American or Hispanic 
is increasing. These schools share a host of disadvantages, in-
cluding fewer science, math, and college preparatory courses.324 
As the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights confirmed in its 2018 
report: “[R]acial, ethnic, and economic segregation remain a re-
ality all across the U.S.”325 
These conditions exist today due in part to increasing pov-
erty rates and the failure of law and policy to address increasing 
racial and socioeconomic segregation. In 2015, one in five of the 
approximately 73.6 million children under the age of eighteen 
living in the United States lived in poverty, with children zero to 
five experiencing the highest likelihood of living in poverty.326 
Schools reflect this high poverty rate and are experiencing in-
creasing poverty levels. While the average low-income public 
school enrollment in 1993 was approximately 25%, by 2013 it 
had risen to just over 50%.327 The average student from a low-
income background attended a school that was just over 50% stu-
dents from low-income backgrounds in 1993, and by 2013 she or 
he attended a school that was composed of approximately 67% 
students from low-income backgrounds.328 The concentration of 
poverty in schools has increased for all races, with African Amer-
ican students experiencing the greatest increase (31%) while 
whites and Latinos also saw a dramatic increase (22%) over this 
time period.329 By 2013, the average African American and La-
tino student attended a school that was about 68% low-income 
students, while whites and Asians attended a school that was 
40% low-income students.330 
Concentrated poverty has an independent adverse impact 
on student outcomes beyond the socioeconomic background of 
 
 324. See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BETTER USE OF INFORMATION COULD 
HELP AGENCIES IDENTIFY DISPARITIES AND ADDRESS RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 
(2016).  
 325. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 27, at 5. 
 326. See FED. INTERAGENCY FORUM ON CHILD & FAMILY STATISTICS, AMER-
ICA’S CHILDREN: KEY NATIONAL INDICATORS OF WELL-BEING 2017 viii, 14, 116 
tbl.ECON1.A (2017). 
 327. See ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 322, at 7 fig.3.  
 328. See id.  
 329. See id. 
 330. See id.  
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the student.331 Concentrated poverty brings with it a host of ed-
ucational challenges because it correlates with factors that in-
crease the cost of successfully educating children, including 
lower educational outcomes, racial isolation, homelessness, and 
increased student mobility.332 In addition, schools of concen-
trated poverty often have less qualified and experienced teach-
ers, fewer educational resources, a narrower curriculum taught 
at a less rigorous level, and additional safety and health prob-
lems.333 Economic segregation also hinders teaching and learn-
ing because “remediation becomes the norm, and teachers have 
little time to challenge the exceptional students who can over-
come the personal, family, and community hardships that typi-
cally interfere with learning.”334 Economic segregation also rein-
forces school resource and quality inequalities.335 
Racial segregation also has returned to many schools in the 
United States. For instance, the percentage of African American 
students in majority white schools peaked at 43.5% in 1988, but 
by 2011, it had returned to 23.2%, which is almost the exact 
same level that it was in 1968 when the Supreme Court an-
nounced that racially segregated schools had to convert to “just 
schools.”336 Between 1988 and 2013, white students decreased in 
their racial isolation while the percentage of schools that are 
90% to 100% minority more than tripled from 5.7% to 18.4%.337 
For the 2013–14 school year, in seventeen states, more than one- 
third of African American students attended schools that were 
90% to 100% minority, with the highest rate for such attendance 
at 65.8% in New York.338 For the same school year, in nine states 
more than one-third of Latino students attended schools that 
 
 331. Darling-Hammond, supra note 32, at 82. 
 332. See BAKER ET AL., supra note 32, at 3; CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP, 
supra note 1, at 38; Rothstein, supra note 169, at 61–69 (noting the educational 
challenges associated with concentrated poverty). 
 333. Darling-Hammond, supra note 32, at 83. 
 334. Rothstein, supra note 169, at 64. 
 335. See CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY Gap, supra note 1, at 38.  
 336. Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cty., 391 U.S. 430, 442 (1968); GARY 
ORFIELD ET AL., UCLA CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, BROWN AT 60: GREAT PROGRESS, 
A LONG RETREAT, AND AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE 2, 10 (2014). 
 337. ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 322, at 3. 
 338. Id. at 4–5 (listing the 17 states and the rate of African American attend-
ance in schools that are 90% to 100% minority as follows: New York (65.8%), 
Illinois (59.6%), Maryland (53.7%), New Jersey (49.2%), Michigan (48.7%), Cal-
ifornia (47.9%), Wisconsin (45.3%), Pennsylvania (45.3%), Mississippi (45.2), 
Tennessee (44.3%), Texas (43.3%), Georgia (43.1%), Alabama (42.1%), Missouri 
(41.4%), Ohio (37.8%), Florida (34.4%), and Louisiana (33.2%)). 
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were 90% to 100% minority with the highest rate for such at-
tendance at 56.8% in New York.339 
In addition, just under two-thirds of all public school stu-
dents in the United States attend schools where at least half of 
their classmates share their race or ethnicity.340 Whites experi-
ence the highest rates of attending school with half of the stu-
dents of the same race.341 In 2014, whites attended schools in 
which more than half of the students were white at the rate of 
81%, although this has decreased since 1995 when the rate for 
whites was 90.5%.342 Further, 44.1% of black public elementary 
and secondary school students attended schools where at least 
half of their classmates also were black, and this rate also has 
declined since 1995 when it was 51.4%.343 For Hispanic students, 
56.7% attended schools in which more than half of their class-
mates also were Hispanic.344 This percentage has risen slightly 
since 1995 when it was 52.6%.345 
Racial segregation by race and class often occurs simultane-
ously with many African American and Hispanic students at-
tending predominately poor schools while middle class students 
predominate in the schools attended by many of their white and 
Asian peers.346 Racial segregation brings with it a host of harm-
ful effects, including providing inferior educational opportunities 
and producing substandard educational outcomes, as I have 
 
 339. Id. at 6 (listing the nine states and the rate of Latino attendance in 
schools that are 90% to 100% minority as follows: New York (56.8%), California 
(56.5%), Texas (53.7%), Rhode Island (49.5%), Illinois (44.9%), New Jersey 
(42.5%), Maryland (40.4%), Arizona (40.3%), and New Mexico (34.7%)). 
 340. ABIGAIL GEIGER, MANY MINORITY STUDENTS GO TO SCHOOLS WHERE 
AT LEAST HALF OF THEIR PEERS ARE THEIR RACE OR ETHNICITY, PEW RES. CTR. 
(Oct. 25, 2017), http://pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/10/25/many-minority 
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-ethnicity/ft-17-10-24-raceeducation-nearlytwothirds. 
 341. Id.  
 342. Id.  
 343. Id. 
 344. Id. 
 345. Id. 
 346. ROSLYN ARLIN MICKELSON, NAT’L COAL. ON SCH. DIVERSITY, SCHOOL 
INTEGRATION AND K-12 OUTCOMES: AN UPDATED QUICK SYNTHESIS OF THE SO-
CIAL SCIENCE EVIDENCE 1, 1 (2016); ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 336, at 2 (noting 
White and Asian students typically attend middle class schools). 
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summarized in past scholarship347 and as other research con-
firms.348  
The good news is that increasing socioeconomic integration 
and racial integration reaps important benefits for students. Re-
search establishes that increasing socioeconomic integration to 
create predominantly middle class schools can improve the aca-
demic achievement of disadvantaged students without reducing 
the achievement of their middle-income peers as long as the 
school remains majority middle class.349 When students from 
low-income schools attend a middle class school, they can gain 
several benefits. First, middle class peers are more academically 
engaged and are less likely to be a behavioral challenge for 
teachers.350 Middle class peers can help to socialize and prepare 
other students for the environments that they will experience in 
college.351 Middle class peers also can provide access to the rela-
tionships and opportunities that can lead to postsecondary suc-
cess.352 Second, more effective teachers with higher expectations 
teach in middle class schools.353 Third, middle class parents are 
more involved in schools and are able to exert more influence 
over school officials.354 Fortunately, socioeconomic integration 
 
 347. Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Constitutional Future of Race-Neutral 
Efforts to Achieve Diversity and Avoid Racial Isolation in Elementary and Sec-
ondary Schools, 50 B.C. L. REV. 277, 327–36 (2009) (citing Jomills Henry Brad-
dock II & Tamela McNulty Eitle, The Effects of School Desegregation, in HAND-
BOOK OF RESEARCH ON MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION 828 (James A. Banks & 
Cherry A. McGee Banks eds., 2004)); Janet Ward Schofield, Fostering Positive 
Intergroup Relations in Schools, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON MULTICUL-
TURAL EDUCATION, supra, at 799; Maureen T. Hallinan, Diversity Effects on 
Student Outcomes: Social Science Evidence, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 733 (1998); Amy 
Stuart Wells & Erica Frankenberg, The Public Schools and the Challenge of the 
Supreme Court’s Integration Decision, 89 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 178 (2007). 
 348. See, e.g., MICKELSON, supra note 346, at 1; ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 
336, at 37. 
 349. RYAN, supra note 27, at 273. 
 350. See Richard D. Kahlenberg, Turnaround Schools and Charter Schools 
That Work: Moving Beyond Separate but Equal, in THE FUTURE OF SCHOOL IN-
TEGRATION: SOCIOECONOMIC DIVERSITY AS AN EDUCATION REFORM STRATEGY 
283, 284 (2012) [hereinafter THE FUTURE OF SCHOOL INTEGRATION].  
 351. See ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 322, at 6 (highlighting that when low-
income students socialize only with other low-income students, they are less 
prepared for college). 
 352. See id. at 6 (noting that when low-income students remain segregated, 
they miss out on better opportunities associated with informal information and 
contacts). 
 353. See Kahlenberg, supra note 350, at 286–87. 
 354. See id. at 286.  
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can be a particularly cost effective strategy, with one study find-
ing that the public return on investing in socio-economically in-
tegrated schools is three times its costs and the total return is 
more than five times its costs.355 The only educational invest-
ment with a higher investment return is very high-quality early 
childhood education, an intervention that is discussed in Part 
II.C.356 
Students also benefit from racial integration, although the 
benefit of socioeconomic integration is larger for academic 
achievement.357 For example, desegregation helped to reduce the 
opportunity gaps for black and white students in the South in 
teacher quality, class size, and per-pupil spending.358 Students 
who attended a desegregated school performed at higher aca-
demic levels than students in segregated schools and the benefit 
increased the earlier the student entered a desegregated 
school.359 Students who attend racially integrated schools 
demonstrate a reduction in racial prejudice and stereotypes, an 
increase in interracial friendships, a more effective ability to 
navigate multiracial settings, and a greater likelihood to live in 
integrated neighborhoods.360 Students, particularly students of 
color, in integrated schools also show such benefits as “develop-
ment of critical thinking skills, higher graduation rates, more 
prominent educational and career goals, greater earnings in the 
workforce, and even more positive health outcomes.”361  
Students from all racial groups and socioeconomic back-
grounds benefit from diversity, but the largest gains are for mi-
 
 355. See Marco Basile, The Cost-Effectiveness of Socioeconomic School Inte-
gration, in THE FUTURE OF SCHOOL INTEGRATION, supra note 350, at 127, 128.  
 356. Richard D. Kahlenberg, From All Walks of Life: New Hope for School 
Integration, AM. EDUCATOR 2, 7 (Winter 2012–13). 
 357. See, e.g., RYAN, supra note 27, at 273; AMY STUART WELLS ET AL., CEN-
TURY FOUND., HOW RACIALLY DIVERSE SCHOOLS AND CLASSROOMS CAN BENE-
FIT ALL STUDENTS 12–15 (2016); U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 27, 
at 5.  
 358. Sean F. Reardon & Ann Owens, 60 Years After Brown: Trends and Con-
sequences of School Segregation, 40 ANN. REV. SOC. 199, 210–12 (2014). 
 359. JENNIFER AYSCUE ET AL., NAT’L COAL. ON SCH. DIVERSITY, THE COM-
PLEMENTARY BENEFITS OF RACIAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC DIVERSITY IN SCHOOLS 
1–2 (2017); see also Rucker C. Johnson, Long-Run Impacts of School Desegrega-
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Working Paper No. 16664, 2011) (“Black cohorts with more school-age years of 
desegregation exposure have higher completed years of education than unex-
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 360. See MICKELSON, supra note 346, at 4.  
 361. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 27, at 5. 
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nority students from economically disadvantaged back-
grounds.362 Furthermore, it is important to understand that alt-
hough the gains from socioeconomic and racial diversity overlay, 
each type of diversity provides “unique effects for learners.”363 
Therefore, both socioeconomic and racial integration should re-
main the aims of policy rather than solely focusing on one of 
these goals. 
2. Why ESSA Will Fail to Meet This Challenge 
The U.S. Department of Education supports a handful of 
small grant programs that include economic and racial integra-
tion among their goals. For instance, the oldest and largest sup-
port for integration is the Magnet Schools Assistance Program, 
which aims to bring together students from different racial, eth-
nic, and economic backgrounds.364 In fiscal year 2017, DOE 
awarded $91.7 million to thirty-two grantees in sixteen states,365 
which was down from the $104 million offered in fiscal year 
2009.366 This program reaches over 2.5 million students.367 
ESSA will increase funding for magnet schools to $108 million 
by fiscal year 2020.368  
 
 362. See MICKELSON, supra note 346, at 2.  
 363. Id.; see Reyn van Ewijk & Peter Sleegers, The Effect of Peer Socioeco-
nomic Status on Student Achievement: A Meta-Analysis, 5 EDUC. RES. REV. 134 
(2010); Susan E. Mayer, How Much Does a High School’s Racial and Socioeco-
nomic Mix Affect Graduation and Teenage Fertility Rates?, in THE URBAN UN-
DERCLASS 321 (Christopher Jencks & Paul Peterson eds., 1991); Gregory J. 
Palardy, High School Socioeconomic Segregation and Student Attainment, 50 
AM. EDUC. RES. J. 714 (2013).  
 364. See 20 U.S.C. § 7231 (2016). 
 365. Office of Innovation & Improvement, Magnet Schools Assistance Pro-
gram (MSAP), What’s New, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://innovation.ed.gov/what 
-we-do/parental-options/magnet-school-assistance-program-msap (last visited 
Oct. 27, 2018). 
 366. Office of Innovation & Improvement, Magnet Schools Assistance Pro-
gram (MSAP), Funding and Legislation, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., https://innovation 
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Although ESSA did not highlight integration of schools as a 
policy priority,369 ESSA included modest requirements to 
strengthen the Magnet Schools Assistance Program, including 
requiring grant applicants to note their evidence or rationale for 
how the magnet school will improve integration.370 Grantees also 
must show how they will measure and assess the impact of inte-
gration activities on student achievement.371 Grantees may now 
use the funds to create inter-district or regional magnet pro-
grams.372 ESSA also allows grant funds to be used to support 
transportation costs if the transportation is sustainable beyond 
the grant and is not a substantial portion of the grant funds.373 
Despite these modest improvements, the very small allocation 
for the Magnet Schools Assistance Program will make magnet 
schools a low to nonexistent policy priority for most districts and 
states. States and districts that choose to implement socioeco-
nomic and racial integration programs will do so solely because 
it is a state or local priority rather than a federal one.374 
The failure to include socioeconomic and racial integration 
as a policy priority within ESSA is a valuable missed oppor-
tunity. Socioeconomic integration provides a cost-effective ap-
proach to improving student outcomes while not harming the 
 
School Diversity, WASH. POST (Mar. 29, 2017), https://washingtonpost.com/ 
news/education/wp/2017/03/29/trumps-education-department-nixes-obama-era 
-grant-program-for-school-diversity. Other grant programs that support eco-
nomic integration include the Education Innovation and Research program and 
the Charter Schools program. See Charter Schools Program Grants for Replica-
tion and Expansion of High-Quality Charter Schools, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., https:// 
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cation Innovation and Research, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., https://innovation.ed.gov/ 
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achievement of middle class students.375 Therefore, this reform 
warrants inclusion within federal education priorities as reform-
ers search for affordable school reforms. These benefits stand in 
sharp contrast to the many adverse effects of the standards and 
accountability movement that remain the centerpiece of ESSA, 
including teaching to the test, testing limited levels of 
knowledge, and the narrowing of the curriculum to name a few 
of the adverse effects of this approach under No Child Left Be-
hind.376 Similarly, racial integration brings benefits that other 
reforms cannot, including teaching students to work with those 
unlike themselves and reducing stereotypes.377 The United 
States cannot rely on states to urge districts to promote class and 
race integration.378 Therefore, the federal government must take 
the lead on pursuing these critical policy objectives. 
In the next Section, I propose how Congress should restruc-
ture ESEA to advance educational equity. 
III.  RESTRUCTURING ESEA’S APPROACH TO EQUITY   
Although state chief school officers have signed a statement 
supporting equity, early reviews of state plans reveal a minimal 
commitment to equity by many states and indicate that it will 
take much more than a state-initiated statement supporting eq-
uity to ensure equitable access to excellent educational opportu-
nities for all students.379 Federal leadership is essential to sup-
port and incentivize states to meet the needs of disadvantaged 
students.380 Further evidence of the need for federal leadership 
can be found in the fact that the Council of Chief State School 
Officers opposed the proposed regulatory revisions to the supple-
ment-not-supplant requirement that would have required dis-
tricts to spend the same funds, including teacher salaries, on Ti-
tle I and non-Title I schools.381 If the states are in fact committed 
to equity in funding, this provision could have been, and argua-
bly should have been, merely the start of an effort to advance 
educational equity. Instead, civil rights advocates championed 
 
 375. See RYAN, supra note 27, at 273.  
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 377. See RYAN, supra note 27, at 273–74.  
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the need to give meaning to this toothless requirement and the 
states opposed it, citing compliance challenges and potential ad-
verse consequences such as forced teacher transfers.382  
However, ESSA has sparked some positive reforms and fed-
eral efforts to advance equity can build on those efforts. For ex-
ample, when permitted to select an additional indicator of school 
performance, at least thirty-five states are assessing college and 
career readiness, including SAT and ACT scores, and access to 
and passage of International Baccalaureate and Advanced 
Placement courses.383 Many states also are assessing if students 
are on track in middle and high school, which can help to prevent 
students from lagging behind or dropping out.384 State inclusion 
of these measures begins a process that can be nurtured to ex-
pand the opportunity to learn and to increase graduation rates. 
As I explain below, the federal government should leverage 
and expand upon the $550 billion that it spends on public edu-
cation annually385 to create a supportive partnership with states 
that are seeking to meet the needs of all students. It also should 
incentivize states that are merely paying lip service to equity 
goals to implement sustained and comprehensive reforms. The 
regular reauthorization of ESEA provides lawmakers, advo-
cates, and the American people the opportunity to reexamine 
and restructure how they want to achieve equity. 
Other scholars have provided an array of recommendations 
for reforming ESEA,386 including Title I.387 In this Part, I build 
upon this body of work while emphasizing the incremental ap-
proach that I recently proposed in No Quick Fix for Equity and 
Excellence: The Virtues of Incremental Shifts in Education Fed-
eralism.388 In contrast to other scholars that typically propose a 
single reform or an array of reforms to be implemented in a sin-
gle piece of legislation or policymaking, in No Quick Fix I argue 
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that the backlash against the significant shift to education fed-
eralism embraced in No Child Left Behind should teach us that 
the nation will not embrace reforms that result in quick and rad-
ical shifts to education federalism.389 Instead, a more effective 
approach would incrementally build toward the ultimate law 
and policymaking goal of equitable access to an excellent educa-
tion.390 
In No Quick Fix, I proposed that the United States imple-
ment three types of reforms that could lead to comprehensive 
restructuring of education funding systems: inviting incentives, 
compelling (but not coercive) conditions, and meaningful man-
dates.391 Here, I translate my lessons for school funding to in-
form adoption of my model for an institutional approach to eq-
uity that would prepare for and ultimately reauthorize ESEA. I 
recommend federal incentives and conditions that together pro-
vide a more powerful and ultimately sustainable engine for 
change than any one of these strategies alone. I also briefly con-
sider when mandates might be employed to provide a long-term 
national commitment to norms and policymaking objectives that 
prove successful under ESEA. 
Fundamentally, my recommendations acknowledge that the 
United States must change not just specific laws and policies but 
ultimately the nation’s approach to education federalism.392 
Without a foundational change to education federalism, reforms 
that advance equitable access to an excellent education will con-
tinue to be sacrificed at the altar of state and local control. With 
incremental shifts to education federalism undergirding reform, 
the United States can enact policies that move the nation to-
wards greater equality and quality of educational opportunities 
for all students. My proposal for reforming education federalism 
seeks to establish a more collaborative federal-state partnership 
for education that expands state capacity for reform while draw-
ing upon federal policymaking strengths. The nature of the fed-
eral-state partnership will vary in part depending on the capac-
ity of a state to enact reform and its need for federal support and 
expertise. 
Although some might question why this Article recommends 
reforms at the federal level at a time when the federal govern-
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 390. See id. 
 391. Id. at 220–37. 
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ment has shifted toward greater state and local control of educa-
tion, focusing on federal reforms makes sense given the federal 
government’s superior track record for enacting reforms that 
promote equal opportunity as compared to the states. This track 
record has been established through an array of federal educa-
tion laws, including Title IX of the Education Amendments of 
1972, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Education for All Hand-
icapped Children Act of 1975, and Pell Grants under the Higher 
Education Act of 1965, to name a few.393 
My recommendations for reforming ESEA move beyond my 
framework in No Quick Fix in three important ways. First, my 
current focus is on how the United States should restructure its 
approach to reauthorizing ESEA. ESEA often includes untested 
reforms that are sharply criticized when they prove ineffective. 
My recommendations reveal that an effectual and impactful 
ESEA depends upon testing potential ESEA reforms before they 
serve as conditions for federal education funds. Second, while No 
Quick Fix focused on a long-term agenda for moving toward eq-
uitable funding, this article applies this framework to four criti-
cal education building blocks that would work synergistically 
within ESEA to achieve equity. Finally, my recommendations for 
reforming ESEA are calibrated to each specific building block by 
analyzing the current state of research on these building blocks 
and anticipating potential obstacles to incorporating each build-
ing block into ESEA, including practical and political obstacles. 
Therefore, this Article provides novel insights to guide future 
reauthorizations of ESEA, bolstering the concepts introduced in 
No Quick Fix with practical implementation and sustainability 
measures. 
Section A describes the components of my incremental ap-
proach and why I believe it represents a superior approach for 
the type of comprehensive education reform that restructuring 
ESEA will require. Sections B through E explore how this ap-
 
 393. See Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 
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structuring education federalism, please see Robinson, supra note 50, at 983–
1005. 
  
978 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:915 
 
proach could be applied to federal incentive grants and reauthor-
ization of ESEA to ensure that states provide the essential build-
ing blocks for educational equity that are discussed in Part II, 
including fair funding, an equitable distribution of effective 
teachers, high-quality preK-12 opportunities to learn, and eco-
nomic and racial integration. 
A. NO QUICK FIX 
Before summarizing how incentives and conditions (with a 
limited discussion of future mandates) could be employed to sup-
port a reauthorization of ESEA that effectively advances equity, 
it is crucial to understand that each reform is intended to inform 
the structure of the preceding reform.394 For example, new con-
ditions in ESEA should build upon lessons learned from federal 
incentives that aim to achieve the same policymaking objective. 
Thus, my recommendations are preliminary in nature because it 
is difficult to predict the impact of, and response to, the preced-
ing reform. However, it is important to consider the full array of 
potential reforms so that a comprehensive, long-term solution is 
designed, rather than a one-time solution that falls short of its 
goals.395 
1. Inviting Incentives 
Incentives offer federal support and funding to encourage 
states to consider adopting preferred policy approaches.396 Even 
before such incentives are adopted, the federal government must 
make the case to the American people that reform is needed.397 
Once the need for reform is explained, federal incentives send a 
signal that the federal government is prioritizing a preferred re-
form within its policymaking agenda, while not insisting that 
states implement particular reforms. The expressive function of 
incentives highlights a change in the federal approach to educa-
tion reform that is less threatening than conditions and man-
dates and thus can encourage state and local cooperation.398 
Federal incentives can take several forms. Incentives for re-
form should begin by offering research and technical assistance 
that support state efforts to adopt equitable reforms.399 Research 
 
 394. See Robinson, supra note 49, at 221. 
 395. See id. 
 396. See id. at 221–22. 
 397. See id. at 221. 
 398. See id. 
 399. See id. at 222. 
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and technical support can help states avoid approaches that 
have proven unsuccessful and concentrate on promising or 
proven reforms. Research and technical assistance help to ex-
pand the capacity of both state departments of education and lo-
cal school districts, which have sometimes struggled to support 
effective reform, as evidenced with implementation of No Child 
Left Behind.400 The initial implementation of ESSA also is con-
firming that states continue to lack the capacity to drive re-
form.401 In a survey of forty-five states regarding ESSA imple-
mentation, all but one state indicated that the state lacked 
capacity to fulfill one or more requirement.402 
As discussed in greater detail below, federal incentives 
should include grants to help states and districts assess the na-
ture of specific barriers to opportunity and to reward innovative 
and impactful state and district practices.403 Such grants also 
spark additional dialogue about why reforms are needed and the 
potential avenues for reform.404 In a state survey on ESSA im-
plementation, some states noted that they lack sufficient fund-
ing to implement ESSA.405 Federal incentives in the form of 
grants can help to fill this gap in state funding in ways that ex-
pand states’ capacity and thereby empower states to undertake 
comprehensive reform. 
The Race to the Top (RTTT) initiative demonstrated that 
federal incentives can provide a powerful carrot that entices 
states to adopt desired reforms.406 Given that some states have 
begun to pull back from reforms adopted when they hoped to se-
cure RTTT funds that ultimately were not forthcoming, future 
federal incentives should build on the lessons learned from 
RTTT. For example, future federal incentives should provide 
technical assistance on how to write a successful grant applica-
tion and ensure that the program has the ability to reward any 
 
 400. See id. 
 401. See USHOMIRSKY ET AL., supra note 154, at 9. 
 402. CTR. ON EDUC. POLICY, STATES REFLECT ON YEAR ONE IMPLEMENTA-
TION OF ESSA 1 (2017). 
 403. See Robinson, supra note 49, at 222–23. 
 404. See id. at 223. 
 405. CTR. ON EDUC. POLICY, supra note 402, at 1. 
 406. Patrick McGuinn, Stimulating Reform: Race to the Top, Competitive 
Grants and the Obama Education Agenda, 26 EDUC. POL’Y 136, 143–47 (2012). 
But see Henig et al., supra note 90, at 29, 37–38 (arguing that “RTTT’s actual 
impact on state policy is difficult to determine” because some studies show sig-
nificant adoption of the preferred policies but it is unclear which of the policies 
would have been adopted in the absence of RTTT and some states may not sus-
tain the adopted changes). 
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state that demonstrates a strong commitment to lasting equity 
reforms.407 Furthermore, future federal incentives should be dis-
tributed over several years with benchmarks established for the 
receipt of future funds rather than a one-time grant award. This 
can help to ensure that states follow through with the plans in 
grant applications.408 Federal incentives should remain in place, 
even if federal conditions are adopted to provide ongoing encour-
agement for state investments in reform.409  
Incentive grants should use DOE’s discretionary funding, 
rather than funds authorized under ESEA. RTTT resulted from 
$4.35 billion that Congress provided to DOE for “state incentive 
grants.”410 This type of discretionary spending gives the Depart-
ment greater authority to initiate reform efforts without getting 
mired in the types of political battles that kept ESEA from being 
reauthorized for more than seven years.411 Employing discre-
tionary funding also allows the Department greater flexibility to 
adjust the conditions of grant programs for subsequent years in 
response to research regarding the effectiveness of a program. 
One might appropriately question what federal incentives 
have to do with reforming ESEA given that it is a conditional 
spending program. Federal incentives through discretionary 
spending can encourage the laboratory of the states to try re-
forms before they are included as federal conditions for the en-
tire nation through ESEA. If this approach had been adopted for 
the accountability and school sanction approaches in No Child 
Left Behind, perhaps the nation could have avoided the perverse 
incentives of the law that led states to lower standards and cut 
scores and teachers to teach to standardized tests.412 Rather 
than implement innovative reforms through ESEA that require 
the entire nation to test the reform at the same time, a robust 
system of federal incentives that precedes reauthorization could 
help the federal and state governments enter a partnership. In 
this way, states can assess which reforms deserve to be condi-
tions within ESEA and which should be left behind because they 
are ill-conceived, ineffective, infeasible, or too costly. Even as the 
nation waits to see the impact of greater state and local control 
 
 407. See Robinson, supra note 49, at 223–24. 
 408. See id. at 224–25. 
 409. See id. at 225. 
 410. McGuinn, supra note 406, at 139. 
 411. Cf. Klein, supra note 17, at 43 (detailing the arduous political process 
behind the passage of the ESSA). 
 412. See RYAN, supra note 27, at 944–59, 973. 
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over education under ESSA, the federal government should con-
tinue to encourage experimentation through an ongoing pro-
gram of federal incentives for promising  equity reforms that 
could be implemented in future ESEA reauthorizations. 
2. Compelling (But Not Unconstitutionally Coercive) 
Conditions 
As conditional spending legislation, reforms of ESEA will 
take the form of conditions within the law. Conditions explain 
what a state or district must do to receive federal funding. If the 
conditions for receiving funds are not met, the DOE is empow-
ered to seek the return of the funds, although this rarely oc-
curs.413 
Conditions in ESEA must not violate the parameters for 
Spending Clause legislation in National Federation of Independ-
ent Business v. Sebelius, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion was unconsti-
tutionally coercive.414 The Court struck down the law because 
states were ultimately compelled to accept the Medicaid pro-
gram given the large size of the program, its deep entrenchment 
in the states, and the potential loss of both new and old Medicaid 
funding.415 In contrast, any future reauthorization of ESEA 
would condition new money on new conditions that represent 
only a fraction of Medicaid funding and thus would not contra-
vene Sebelius.416 
When considering potential ESEA conditions, it is helpful to 
understand that ESEA conditions currently range from merely 
setting forth possibilities for states to consider to very prescrip-
tive terms. For instance, for the fourth indicator for accountabil-
ity systems, ESSA states that public schools must include “one 
indicator of school quality or student success” and that this may 
include such measures as “student engagement,” “educator en-
gagement,” “student access to and completion of advanced 
coursework,” “postsecondary readiness,” “school climate and 
safety,” and “any other indicator the State chooses that meets 
 
 413. See MANNA, supra note 151, at 53. 
 414. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 579–80 (2012) (plu-
rality opinion). 
 415. See id. at 579–80. In both No Quick Fix and Disrupting Education Fed-
eralism, I have analyzed in greater detail why NFIB v. Sebelius provides ample 
room for robust education legislation. See Robinson, supra note 49, at 225–26; 
Robinson, supra note 50, at 1006–11. 
 416. See Robinson, supra note 49, at 226; Robinson, supra note 50, at 1009–
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the requirements of this clause.”417 This condition is really an 
invitation to states to decide on the additional school quality or 
student success indicator that they think will be most effective. 
The state plans may also include student growth if the state 
deems it appropriate.418 In contrast, each state plan must in-
clude a statewide accountability system that identifies the 
achievement of all students and the achievement of economically 
disadvantaged, racial, ethnic, disabled, and English-learner stu-
dent subgroups.419 
The varying degrees of prescriptiveness in these conditions 
reveal that conditions can require states to adopt a very specific 
policy approach, invite states to adopt a policy approach on a 
particular topic, and everything in between. Therefore, it is im-
portant to calibrate recommendations for new ESEA conditions 
in light of the degree of prescriptiveness that is appropriate for 
the particular policy agenda. In Sections B through E, I provide 
greater detail on recommendations for potential ESEA condi-
tions that could help to align ESEA to advance equity. 
3. Meaningful Mandates 
Once the United States embraces a set of principles for edu-
cation that the nation believes are both effective and should 
stand the test of time, those conditions should be considered for 
a federal mandate through either law or regulation. Mandates 
would transform an ESEA condition that has stood the test of 
time into a permanent fixture on the nation’s education land-
scape. Given the fact that education is consistently evolving in 
response to new research, federal mandates about educational 
equity should only rarely be adopted. Yet, some principles can 
and should be embraced for future generations and it is these 
principles that could first be tested with incentives and then as 
ESEA conditions, but ultimately be embraced with long-term 
legislation or regulations. 
One example of such legislation is Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972.420 The United States no longer needs to 
debate whether sex discrimination is permissible in education. 
Instead, the Title IX prohibition on sex discrimination endures 
 
 417. See 20 U.S.C. § 6311(c)(4)(B)(v) (2016). 
 418. See id. § 6311(c)(4)(B)(i). 
 419. See id. § 6311(c)(1), (2), (4)(B)(i). 
 420. See Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Education Amend-
ments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, §§ 901–907, 86 Stat. 235, 373–75 (codified as 
amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2012)). 
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while ESEA changes in each reauthorization. There are other 
requirements for education that are essential to an excellent and 
equitable education, and these requirements should not be per-
mitted to terminate based on which way the political wind blows. 
For instance, adequate and equitable funding is essential for 
providing the components of an excellent and equitable educa-
tion and the United States should embrace a national commit-
ment to this critical foundation for educational equity. 
4. Opposition to the No Quick Fix Approach 
Undoubtedly, some will be opposed to the approach I pro-
posed in No Quick Fix. In No Quick Fix, I analyze the costs and 
benefits of my proposal and explain why an incremental ap-
proach to shifting education federalism would be superior to the 
approach in No Child Left Behind that adopted an immediate 
and dramatic change to education federalism.421 Here, it is worth 
noting that the primary opposition to my proposal for restructur-
ing education federalism will be the insistence that state and lo-
cal control should continue to remain largely unfettered because 
states and localities possess superior knowledge on what their 
schools and schoolchildren need.  
When it comes to equity, state action, in contrast to states’ 
claims, has historically shown the states to be “uninterested in 
education equity” and states rarely respond to data that reveals 
inequities.422 Federal leadership is essential for the United 
States to move beyond the rhetorical commitment to equal op-
portunity that most Americans espouse to the reality of equita-
ble and excellent schools.423 Congress must insist that educa-
tional equity remain a national priority, just as it has insisted 
upon other civil rights laws in education.424 
Nevertheless, state and local control would remain an essen-
tial characteristic of the U.S. education system if my model is 
adopted. State and local actors would continue to decide such is-
sues as standards, achievement goals, school design, and the 
lion’s share of educational opportunities and resources. States 
and localities would merely be required to distribute educational 
opportunities and resources in ways that aim to meet students’ 
needs rather than in ways that privilege certain groups while 
 
 421. See Robinson, supra note 49, at 237–49. 
 422. Brown, supra note 23, at 165. 
 423. JENNIFER HOCHSCHILD & NATHAN SCOVRONICK, THE AMERICAN 
DREAM AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 10–11 (2003). 
 424. See supra text accompanying note 393. 
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shortchanging others. The latter form of state and local control 
has reigned for too long in the United States and must be re-
placed by state and local control that empowers but does not op-
press. 
In the next Sections, I consider how these three federal tools 
could be used to guide reforms that help to more effectively align 
ESEA to advance equity. 
B. FAIR FUNDING 
No Quick Fix focuses exclusively on my recommendations 
that would lead states to reform school funding systems so that 
they ensure equitable access to an excellent education. I briefly 
summarize those recommendations here while offering some 
new insights on how fair funding could be advanced through a 
future ESEA reauthorization. Any conditions in ESEA on fair 
funding will likely be met with considerable opposition from 
states and districts. This opposition is likely given the longstand-
ing opposition of most states to court-ordered reforms in school 
finance litigation.425 Most recently, many state and local leaders 
also expressed opposition when DOE considered prohibiting 
spending disparities between Title I and non-Title I schools 
through its supplement-not-supplant regulation.426 State oppo-
sition to funding equity occurs due to a variety of factors, includ-
ing the reluctance of the states to increase or redistribute spend-
ing, the suburban domination of state legislatures, and the 
erroneous belief that money does not improve educational out-
comes.427 
The ESSA requirement to publicly report per-pupil spend-
ing will provide parents, communities, and school districts with 
new information about funding inequities. This data will breathe 
additional life into the ongoing dialogue among reformers, schol-
ars, and legislators in states about the need for greater funding 
equity. However, as I explained in Part II.B.2, this additional 
data alone will not be sufficient to ignite widespread funding re-
form. 
Once public scrutiny of school funding increases, the public, 
reformers, and some states should be hungry for—or at least 
more receptive to—federal support that will help increase the 
fairness of state funding systems.428 Federal support for fair 
 
 425. See RYAN, supra note 27, at 153. 
 426. See Klein, supra note 205. 
 427. See RYAN, supra note 27, at 148, 153, 172. 
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funding should build state capacity for reform by offering re-
search and technical assistance on how states can achieve fair 
funding and federal grants that incentivize state adoption of in-
novative approaches to fair funding.429 Through research, the 
federal government should publicize the lessons that states have 
learned and will learn about fair funding. Technical assistance 
should send federal expertise to state legislatures and depart-
ments of education to help states comprehend how to operation-
alize fair funding within state budgets, which must be balanced 
annually. Funding incentives should encourage states to reform 
the practices that research has proven lead to inequitable school 
funding, including providing more funding to affluent families, 
failing to link funding systems to educational goals, low funding 
levels, and ineffective oversight of how funding is allocated and 
utilized.430 
As these reforms confirm and reshape trends in law and pol-
icymaking about the necessary elements of a fair funding sys-
tem, the United States should include fair funding conditions 
within ESEA.431 Given the deeply-entrenched nature of state 
funding systems, I believe that conditions within ESEA on this 
topic should begin with a general requirement that states 
demonstrate how their funding systems fairly and equitably al-
locate state and local funding. This requirement should include 
some specificity to ensure that states explain how they are ad-
dressing the primary shortcomings of funding systems, such as 
regressive funding and low funding levels, rather than merely 
inviting vague generalizations from states that their funding 
systems are fair and equitable without a way to measure if fair-
ness and equity have been achieved.432 Once the nation has seen 
the impact of such a condition, Congress could design more pre-
scriptive conditions based on the most effective reforms sparked 
by federal incentives and state funding reforms, such as requir-
ing progressive funding and a robust system of oversight and ac-
countability for ensuring that funds are being used both effi-
ciently and effectively. 
 
that reward innovation could be structured to encourage ongoing state reform 
of funding systems). 
 429. See id. at 222–23.  
 430. See id. at 210–20 (identifying these issues as some of the primary short-
comings of state funding systems). 
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By moving from a general to a prescriptive set of ESEA con-
ditions regarding fair funding, the United States could avoid the 
backlash that would occur from moving from almost no condi-
tions on fair funding to very prescriptive conditions. No Child 
Left Behind provides a cautionary tale that the nation should be 
slow to adopt prescriptive ESEA conditions that are untested in 
the laboratories of the states, particularly for an area as im-
portant as school funding that provides the very foundation of 
our nation’s education system. My incremental approach pro-
vides an opportunity to determine which ESEA conditions would 
prove most fruitful and which conditions might engender unin-
tended negative consequences. 
One avenue for general and then prescriptive ESEA condi-
tions to encourage fair funding would be to establish a separate 
program within ESEA focused on this issue.433 One benefit of 
this approach is that states could choose to accept or reject fund-
ing for this program while continuing to accept funding for other 
ESEA programs.434 The funding for these ESEA conditions must 
be sufficient to entice states to accept the funding. Once the na-
tion is confident that the appropriate conditions for fair funding 
have been identified through state experimentation, funding 
conditions included within Title I provide the most likely route 
to encourage widespread state buy in and reform.435 
The national conversation that new funding data sparks 
should increase the political feasibility of adopting grant pro-
grams that encourage fair funding as well as fair funding condi-
tions within ESEA. Federal funding incentives also should in-
crease public awareness of the benefits of reforms and their 
feasibility. My proposals as well as those of other scholars pro-
vide an array of potential conditions that could be studied and 
ultimately included within ESEA, including proposals to reform 
the comparability requirement within Title I.436 For instance, ed-
ucation scholar Derek Black recently recommended that ESEA 
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funds be conditioned on states weighting their funding formulas 
to meet the needs of disadvantaged students while the federal 
government simultaneously increases its funding from $15 bil-
lion to $45 billion.437 Congress should consider both the lessons 
from federal fair funding incentives and the full array of schol-
arly proposals for reform that include increasing federal educa-
tion funding as it develops a separate fair funding program 
within ESEA or incorporates new conditions into Title I of ESEA. 
Finally, the United States should consider future long-term 
legislation that requires progressive funding, with an appropri-
ate transition period for states to reform their funding systems. 
This requirement would end the practice of favoring the rich over 
the poor438 when poor students have greater needs,439 and would 
bring the United States in line with most other developed na-
tions that direct more funding to economically disadvantaged 
children.440 Such a mandate could be embedded within a guar-
antee of a federal right to education, which is the right discussed 
in my forthcoming book Thoughts on a Federal Right to Educa-
tion,441 or adopted through legislation under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.442 Furthermore, moving some reforms 
from conditions within ESEA to long-term legislation could re-
duce the burden on ESEA to solve the nation’s education chal-
lenges. Further exploration of potential mandates on fair fund-
ing should await the insights of federal incentives and ESEA 
conditions that seek to achieve this aim. 
Clearly, such a legislative mandate is not politically feasible 
at this time because ESSA represents a substantial reduction in 
the federal role in education.443 Nevertheless, given that many 
other developed countries have embraced progressive funding 
and are outperforming the United States,444 the United States 
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may eventually come to view this as a policy approach that ben-
efits the entire nation. ESSA’s requirement to report per pupil 
spending may make such legislation more politically feasible for 
future generations. If federal incentives and ESEA conditions 
prove successful, they also could prepare the nation for future 
mandates on this issue. 
An increase in state efforts to provide fair funding is an es-
sential foundation for the remaining elements of my model for 
institutional equity. Therefore, within the reform agenda, fund-
ing should be prioritized for federal incentives and ESEA condi-
tions. 
C. AN EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF EFFECTIVE TEACHERS 
Teacher quality factors such as the background, prepara-
tion, experience, and certification of teachers exert significant 
influence on student achievement.445 Some of the current state 
approaches to evaluate teachers as well as state tenure and dis-
missal policies have hindered efforts to improve the quality of 
teachers and student outcomes.446 However, the flaws of current 
teacher evaluation, tenure, and dismissal policies demonstrate 
that further research is needed on how to measure teacher qual-
ity consistently over time. Another challenge for improving the 
access of disadvantaged and minority students to effective teach-
ers is that states do not directly control hiring or placement of 
teachers within districts.447 In addition, high-poverty schools of-
ten pay their teachers less than low-poverty schools. For in-
stance, math teachers in schools with 50% or more students in 
poverty earned approximately $7,000 less than teachers in 
schools with 10% or less students in poverty.448 
These challenges suggest that federal involvement in pro-
moting the equitable distribution of effective teachers should 
proceed in four phases. First, the U.S. Department of Education 
should create a grant program that incentivizes states and dis-
tricts to experiment with how teacher quality and effectiveness 
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can be consistently measured and reported over time and be-
tween classrooms, schools, and districts. This might include such 
efforts as developing teacher report cards or numerical scores for 
teachers that include an array of factors. 
Second, DOE should employ grant programs to encourage 
experimentation with how states and districts can ensure an eq-
uitable distribution of high-quality teachers. This phase should 
include a priority for experimenting with which incentives are 
effective at attracting and retaining some of the best teachers for 
the students who have the greatest educational needs.449 For in-
stance, research indicates that limited administrative support, 
low salaries, and low-quality working conditions that are en-
demic to disadvantaged schools explain a great deal of the high 
teacher turnover rates in such schools.450 Districts will be better 
able to recruit and retain high-quality teachers in disadvantaged 
schools when equitable funding enhances administrative sup-
port, creates competitive teacher salaries and benefits, and ad-
dresses other evidence-based factors that influence teacher re-
cruitment and retention, such as effective training, ongoing 
teacher mentoring, and impactful professional development.451 
This phase should also encourage research on how teacher 
tenure and dismissal policies adversely affect the equitable dis-
tribution of high-quality teachers and how unions and districts 
can work together to achieve this goal.452 Attention must be paid 
to ensuring the equitable distribution of teachers without creat-
ing perverse incentives for the teaching profession. For instance, 
if teachers were assigned to schools without any consideration of 
their preferences throughout their careers, the nation would wit-
ness a sharp decline in those entering the teaching profession. 
Successful collaborations between districts and teacher unions 
also should be examined.453 Some research has been conducted 
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on these issues, but additional research would be valuable if 
ESEA is ultimately going to condition funds to states and dis-
tricts on having effective plans for the equitable distribution of 
teachers. 
DOE should highlight and disseminate effective approaches 
from each of these phases.454 In addition, technical assistance 
from DOE for states and districts can help them achieve their 
intended aims.455 Multiyear payouts should be included with 
clear conditions on what is required for future payments given 
the tendency of states to take federal money while avoiding the 
required reforms.456 These two phases would build upon ESEA 
and grant programs that seek to improve teacher quality, includ-
ing the Transition to Teaching program that seeks to recruit ex-
perienced, mid-career professionals to teach in disadvantaged 
schools as well as the Race to the Top District program that in-
vited grantees to develop innovative improvements to teaching 
that improve student achievement.457 
Like the funding proposals noted in Part III.B, the proposed 
grant programs should use discretionary funding and be mod-
eled after the RTTT program while simultaneously avoiding 
some of the pitfalls of RTTT.458 Although some districts were al-
ready experimenting with evaluating teachers based on student 
achievement before RTTT, after RTTT some states repealed laws 
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that prohibited using student achievement data to evaluate 
teachers; other states adopted requirements that teacher evalu-
ation or tenure decisions include student achievement data; and, 
still others used RTTT to build momentum for reforms of teacher 
evaluation.459 Even though a majority of states did not enact re-
forms of teacher accountability,460 RTTT can still be credited 
with sparking significant teacher quality reforms in numerous 
states. The success of RTTT demonstrates that a large grant pro-
gram can entice many states to reconsider how it evaluates 
teachers. However, care should be taken to provide a broad pro-
gram capable of helping most states so that the program sur-
vives the criticism of unsuccessful applicants and the Congress-
men and women who represent them.461 
The third phase of reform would focus on direct federal sup-
port for increasing the quality and distribution of teachers. For 
this phase, I agree with the recommendation of Linda Darling-
Hammond and Gary Sykes that the United States should imple-
ment a “major education manpower program” modeled after fed-
eral support for training and distributing doctors to shortage ar-
eas.462 This federal program would aim to achieve three goals: 
“enhancing the supply of qualified teachers targeted to high-
need fields and locations;”463 “improving retention of qualified 
teachers, especially in hard-to-staff schools;”464 and, “creating a 
national labor market by removing interstate barriers to mobil-
ity.”465 This approach recognizes that some schools, districts, and 
 
 459. See McGuinn, supra note 406, at 146.  
 460. See id. at 147. 
 461. See Robinson, supra note 49, at 224. 
 462. See Linda Darling-Hammond & Gary Sykes, Wanted: A National 
Teacher Supply Policy for Education: The Right Way to Meet the “Highly Qual-
ified Teacher” Challenge, 11 EDUC. POL’Y ANALYSIS ARCHIVES, 3 (2003). 
 463. To increase the supply of qualified teachers for high-needs fields and 
locals, Drs. Darling-Hammond and Sykes recommend creating both a long-term 
program of scholarships linked to service and loan forgiveness as well as grants 
to increase the teaching capacities within cities and rural areas. See id. at 32–
33. 
 464. To increase retention of qualified teachers in challenging schools, Drs. 
Darling-Hammond and Sykes suggest federal grants to states to create effective 
teacher induction programs that are integrated into certification and licensure 
requirements, research on effective strategies for improving compensation and 
working conditions in challenging schools, and identifying the needed induce-
ments to enter and remain in teaching. See id. at 34–37. 
 465. See id. at 32. Drs. Darling-Hammond and Sykes propose that the fed-
eral government help to reduce barriers to teacher mobility by creating common 
licensing exams and interstate agreements that increases teacher mobility, sup-
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states are hampered by limited access to high-quality teachers 
because of factors that are outside of their borders.466 This phase 
would occur simultaneously with the first two phases. 
Finally, conditions within ESEA also should be imple-
mented in two phases. This final phase should begin with a sep-
arate program included in ESEA that provides funding to states 
to adopt the approaches that have proven effective. A separate 
program within ESEA will encourage states to be part of the la-
boratory of the states that develops effective approaches for 
teacher evaluation and the equitable distribution of teachers. 
Then, Title I conditions to measure and report teacher quality 
and effectiveness and to ensure equitable distribution of effective 
teachers should build upon the consensus that emerges from the 
first two phases. These provisions must be monitored by DOE 
and technical assistance must be provided to ensure that states 
and districts are complying with the requirements. Without this 
oversight, these conditions will remain empty rhetoric with little 
to no impact on schools and students and thus will remain as 
ineffectual as the current ESSA conditions. This four-step ap-
proach would provide a much stronger foundation of research 
and evidence for impactful ESEA requirements on the equitable 
distribution of effective teachers than the current approach in 
ESSA. 
D. HIGH-QUALITY PREK-12 OPPORTUNITIES TO LEARN 
As I and others have previously recommended, the United 
States should embrace standards that assess and publish the 
state of preK-12 opportunities to learn.467 Given the lack of suc-
cess of past efforts to encourage states to measure and close op-
portunity gaps discussed in Part II.C, how could the federal gov-
ernment effectively motivate states to measure and tackle the 
widespread educational inequities that betray equal opportunity 
and the principles of the American dream? First, any federal in-
centives or conditions within ESEA must be supported by a na-
tional conversation about the costs of inequitable distributions 
 
port for a portable pension system, and investing in research on the labor mar-
ket at the federal, state, and local levels. See id. at 37. 
 466. Id. at 3. 
 467. See Robinson, supra note 50, at 988–94. Others also have argued for 
opportunity to learn standards. See LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER 
LAW ET AL., FRAMEWORK FOR PROVIDING ALL STUDENTS AN OPPORTUNITY TO 
LEARN THROUGH REAUTHORIZATION OF THE ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY ED-
UCATION ACT 2–3 (2010); NAT’L OPPORTUNITY TO LEARN CAMPAIGN, FEDERAL 
RECOMMENDATIONS 8–10 (2009). 
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in educational opportunity468 and the importance of closing op-
portunity gaps to our democracy, economy and national security. 
Only when critical national interests, such as the interest in na-
tional security, economic prosperity, and equal opportunity, 
have been undermined by state transgressions has the federal 
government been willing to enact broad legislation to right these 
wrongs.469 
Second, powerful federal incentives can entice states to 
adopt opportunity to learn standards and close opportunity gaps. 
These incentives should include two components. Federal sup-
port should be provided for states to experiment with the crea-
tion of opportunity to learn standards. For instance, one group 
of scholars recommended that states develop “opportunity dash-
boards” that would enable schools to report both student inputs 
and outputs.470 Support for research on measuring opportunity 
will help states identify which opportunities should be measured 
to help both close opportunity gaps and improve student achieve-
ment. In this phase, the way in which states measure oppor-
tunity to learn should be left to the states. 
In addition, opportunity to learn conditions within ESEA 
should be considered if and when state experimentation has 
proven that opportunity to learn standards provide an effective 
tool for guiding states in closing the opportunity gaps that cause 
achievement gaps. If opportunity to learn standards have a 
proven track record of success, political support for this approach 
should increase, although admittedly some states will never sup-
port opportunity to learn measures because of the spotlight that 
they shine on inequitable practices and their unwillingness to 
remedy them.  
Congress should first create a separate opportunity to learn 
program in ESEA and then incorporate a condition within Title 
I that requires states to adopt such standards.471 Creating a sep-
arate opportunity to learn program allows additional state ex-
perimentation before opportunity to learn standards become a 
condition to receive Title I funds. Any ESEA opportunity to learn 
 
 468. See Robinson, supra note 50, at 986. 
 469. See Barone & DeBray, supra note 6. 
 470. See CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP, supra note 1, at 42. 
 471. See Robinson, supra note 49, at 227–28 (discussing how federal support 
for state funding reform could occur through a separate program within ESEA 
or through conditions for Title I). 
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conditions within Title I should include some minimum require-
ments on what the standards should include based upon state 
experimentation with such standards.472  
Most importantly, both phases of federal support for oppor-
tunity to learn standards and closing opportunity gaps must in-
clude a substantial financial contribution to the price tag for 
closing opportunity gaps, just as federal fair funding incentives 
must bear some of the costs of reforms. Spending more is inade-
quate on its own, but it will be required to expand and improve 
educational opportunities, enhance their after-school and sum-
mer-school experiences, and offer the social supports that are es-
sential for success.473 Additional federal financial assistance will 
provide an essential supplement to the diverse array of state in-
vestments in education. For instance, state investments in early 
childhood education vary greatly. Only fourteen states mandate 
that children attend kindergarten.474 Scholars offer an array of 
policy approaches for states to consider as they expand high-
quality early childhood education, including universal preschool 
for three and four year olds,475 focusing early childhood educa-
tion on low-income districts, and providing access to early child-
hood education on a sliding scale.476 Federal financial support 
for closing opportunity gaps would indicate a firm commitment 
to making educational equity a reality for prekindergarten 
through secondary education. 
Fortunately, this federal financial investment would not re-
quire a federal takeover of schools and districts, but rather a tar-
geted investment that would strengthen state efforts to tackle 
these challenging disparities. This federal investment would 
transform the federal-state relationship into a true partnership 
that would be greatly superior to both the No Child Left Behind 
approach of substantial federal influence with limited invest-
ment and the ESSA approach of limited investment with little 
influence.477 Collectively, these recommendations would replace 
 
 472. A mandate on opportunity to learn standards is not only politically un-
sustainable, but also would lack the flexibility that effective opportunity to learn 
standards would need so that they could evolve with new education research. 
 473. See CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP, supra note 1, at 42. 
 474. Id. at 29. 
 475. See Meredith J. Harbach, Childcare, Vulnerability and the New Parens 
Patriae, YALE L. & POL’Y REV. (forthcoming 2019) (proposing that more states 
should follow the lead of states that currently offer universal preK). 
 476. See CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP, supra note 1, at 30. 
 477. See Robinson, supra note 50, at 1005. 
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the current federalism approach with a more collaborative ap-
proach in which the federal government serves as the ultimate 
guarantor of equal access to an excellent education.478 
E. ECONOMIC AND RACIAL INTEGRATION 
The federal government also should incentivize efforts to 
promote socioeconomic and racial integration. Of the reforms 
that I recommend in my model for institutional design for equity, 
economic integration is in the most nascent stage. By 2016, 
eighty-three school districts and eight charter schools or charter 
networks sought to promote socioeconomic integration through 
student assignments.479 This is a dramatic increase from 1996 
when a study by the Century Foundation only found two districts 
that included socioeconomic integration as a factor in student 
assignment.480 Nevertheless, these efforts are still only being 
made by significantly less than 1% of the nation’s approximately 
13,600 public school districts that educate 50.7 million students 
in 98,300 public schools, including about 6,900 charter 
schools.481 In addition, racial integration has become a disfa-
vored policy goal for many states and districts.482 A recent study 
found sixty districts that are pursuing racial or socioeconomic 
integration or both and that these districts enroll more than 
3.5 million students.483 
Efforts to pursue socioeconomic and racial integration must 
rely on the other three elements of my model to be successful. 
Integration is only achievable when parents may choose among 
well-funded, successful schools with effective teachers that also 
are socioeconomically and racially integrated. Even then, consid-
erable effort will need to be made to convince parents of the ben-
efits and importance of integrated school settings. Without fair 
funding, effective teachers and high-quality learning opportuni-
ties, parents will forego integration to pursue these other essen-
tial components of an excellent education. 
 
 478. See id. at 1002–05. 
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The limited adoption of socioeconomic integration and the 
waning support for racial integration makes my incremental ap-
proach essential for guiding federal support that promotes inte-
gration. As with the recommendation for teacher evaluations, 
federal support should begin with long-term discretionary 
grants to districts that support experimentation with integra-
tion. Such a grant must greatly exceed the size of the Magnet 
Schools Assistance Program because that program only reaches 
thirty-two grantees in sixteen states and approximately 2.5 mil-
lion students.484 This new grant program will help districts and 
states experiment with how to promote integration and to tailor 
approaches to local conditions. For instance, research indicates 
that implementing districtwide choice policies and changing at-
tendance zone boundaries have the greatest ability to socioeco-
nomically integrate most or all schools in a district by class.485 
However, districts also use magnet and charter school admis-
sions and transfer policies to promote integration.486 
This grant program should be combined with federal re-
search and technical assistance to grantees. It also should in-
clude federal efforts to publicize the beneficial impacts of inte-
gration. For example, the public must be made aware that 
concentrated poverty depresses the achievement of children 
from economically disadvantaged families, while socioeconomic 
integration that maintains a strong middle class majority does 
not harm the achievement of more affluent children.487 Even 
with favorable research on the benefits of socioeconomic and ra-
cial integration, opposition to integration remains likely. The 
federal government may be able to overcome some opposition 
through concerted campaigns that highlight that integration is 
an effective approach to raising student achievement and coun-
tering the adverse effects of concentrated poverty and racial iso-
lation that harm the nation.488 
A new ESEA program that promotes integration should be 
included once more states and districts have experimented with 
such efforts. Broader experimentation and success with grants 
should provide the support needed in Congress to embrace more 
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substantial support for integration than the Magnet Schools As-
sistance Program has received. Given the embryonic state of so-
cioeconomic integration efforts and declining support for racial 
integration, the United States is quite a long way off from the 
political support that would be required to include promoting in-
tegration as a condition for Title I funds. Nevertheless, I agree 
with those who have suggested that integration should be incor-
porated within Title I,489 with the caveat that an incremental 
build up to its incorporation will be essential for it to be added 
and retained as a Title I condition in a meaningful way. 
  CONCLUSION   
As understanding of opportunity gaps and theirs costs in-
creases, the American public should begin to seek solutions.490 
This search must be accompanied by a shift in the national dia-
logue from seeking solutions for the challenges of other people’s 
children to seeking solutions for all of our children.491 John 
Dewey’s recognition of the importance of an excellent education 
for the success of our democracy still rings true today. Undoubt-
edly, the state chiefs are taking an important first step toward 
developing solutions to address opportunity gaps by signing on 
to a commitment to equity.492 However, federal support and re-
form will be essential to address the limited capacity and politi-
cal will of most states to make equitable access to an excellent 
education a legislative and policy priority. 
This Article lays bare the ways in which ESSA does not pro-
vide an effective framework to advance equity. Fortunately, 
there is substantial untapped potential and authority at the fed-
eral level to support equity. Future federal incentives and ESEA 
reauthorizations should restructure ESSA’s fundamentally 
flawed approach to equity and instead embrace my model for in-
stitutional design to achieve equity. This approach will prove su-
perior to ESSA because it embraces an incremental approach to 
restructuring education federalism to support federal leadership 
on equity. It also emphasizes a more balanced federal-state part-
nership that makes closing opportunity gaps an essential na-
tional objective as the United States aims to reduce achievement 
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gaps. Improvement is challenging yet attainable with rigorous, 
effective policies.493  
The United States must move forward expeditiously to 
achieve educational equity and excellence. We fail to do so at our 
peril. 
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